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INTRODUCTION
A British freelance journalist has come to Colombia to cover the fortyyear long civil war, and falls in love with a local twenty-something woman
named Lorena. He moves into her family’s home in a rural town near the
Ecuadorian border, and it becomes his base for covering the conflict. Lorena
works evenings at a restaurant in order to support her young daughter, but
is often gone for stretches of time and is secretive about her life. After months
pass, Lorena eventually reveals that she works as a cook for the paramilitaries. She claims to have joined because she comes from a poor family and felt
she had no other options. Friends warn the journalist that his girlfriend not
only cooks for the paramilitaries, but is actually one of the most feared assassins of the “paras.” He refuses to believe them, until one evening when he
discovers Lorena cleaning her gun. He confronts her, and she admits that
the paramilitaries have paid her to assassinate twenty-three people. Soon
after her confession, Lorena herself is murdered in a vengeance killing, leaving her 5-year old daughter to be cared for by her grandmother.1

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1926956
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1. Amor Asesino, LA SEMANA, March 20, 2008, http://www.semana.com/
wf_InfoArticulo.aspx?IdArt=110374 (author’s translation).
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Stories such as Lorena’s are printed daily in the pages of
Colombia’s newspapers. They appear side-by-side with reports
describing the crimes of some of the worst human rights offenders being tried under Colombia’s Peace and Justice Law—
one of the country’s efforts to implement a strategy of transitional justice to achieve accountability for past human rights
violations. In Colombia’s armed conflict, women have been
victims of horrendous human rights violations. But women
are not strictly victims in Colombia’s conflict. Women like
Lorena play an active role in the conflict. Many women who
join armed groups have previously been victims of sexual
abuse, rape, or have suffered from a lack of educational and
social opportunity. Can an individual have her rights vindicated as a victim, yet also be held accountable for the human
rights violations she has committed as a perpetrator? This article argues that in order for transitional justice mechanisms to
achieve their goals of re-legitimizing the state and preventing
the recurrence of violence, it is essential that they view women
who wield violence not as paradoxes, but as complex actors in
a complex world.
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2. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, YOU’LL LEARN NOT TO CRY: CHILD COMBATCOLOMBIA 53 (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/
colombia0903/index.htm. Estimates of how many female combatants exist
in Colombia vary. Human Rights Watch indicates that it is not able to guarantee accuracy of the figures offered by any of its sources, as there is no
precise data on the numbers of females and children involved in conflict in
Colombia. However, it states that between one-fourth and one-half of the
guerillas are female. For the purposes of this article, I utilize the term “combatant” as encompassing the multiplicity of roles that women may play in
their affiliation with irregular armed groups, whether as fighters, recruiters,
cooks, sexual workers, or commanders. For an excellent discussion of the
debate surrounding the terminology used to describe combatants, see
Megan Mackenzie, Securitization and Desecuritization: Female Soldiers and the Reconstruction of Women in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone, 18 SECURITY STUD.
241(2009).
ANTS IN
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In Colombia, it is estimated that over one out of every
four combatants is a woman or a girl.2 It is a conflict in which
some political violence is highly sexualized, and in which women’s bodies become both targets and weapons of violence.
The situation in Colombia challenges transitional justice
mechanisms and human rights law to grapple with the complexity of the roles that women play in violent conflicts. Even
more importantly, however, the challenges of incorporating
female combatants into a transitional justice strategy reveal important truths about the role that gender plays in conflict for
both men and women. These truths can be instructive in helping to conceptualize the role that gender and societal norms
can play within violent conflicts throughout the world.
In this article, I argue that transitional justice and human
rights mechanisms, despite the superficial respect and the attention paid to women’s groups and women’s needs, fail to
reach true gender inclusiveness because they neglect to consider the multiple gendered roles that both men and women
play in conflict and post-conflict. Furthermore, I claim that if
scholars and practitioners examine transitional justice from a
gendered lens, this perspective reveals not only crucial issues
regarding the situation of women in conflict but sparks essential questions about the role of conflict in society that are instrumental to broader conversations about transitional justice.
In this article, I briefly examine several post-conflict mechanisms in the context of Colombia, but I focus primarily on the
theoretical importance of making this inquiry, the dangers of
neglecting it, and the conclusion that examining closely the
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3. MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS:
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 166 (1998).
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challenges in gender and transitional justice has the potential
to teach us about and, indeed, perhaps prevent violent conflict.
Specific protection of women’s rights has emerged as a
prime focus of feminist activism and scholarship in the late
twentieth century.3 This strategy has proven to be an important one in addressing particular components of women’s experiences during conflict. Yet one of the repercussions of having achieved broad-based recognition of women’s rights has
been the development of transitional justice and human rights
mechanisms in which women are perpetually perceived and
treated as “the victim.” This tendency oversimplifies the multiple roles played by women and men in conflict. A human
rights and transitional justice paradigm that encompasses the
diverse experiences of actors and victims demands reframing
transitional justice so that it is compatible with a gender-oriented critique.
In Section I of this article, I introduce the concept of transitional justice as a mechanism of accountability for human
rights violations. In Section II, I outline three progressive approaches to feminist critique of transitional justice initiatives.
I then examine the most recent body of critical feminist scholarship, highlighting some of the gender biases found in mainstream approaches transitional justice, and exposing what I
consider to be “false dichotomies,” upon which transitional
justice mechanisms may rely. In Section III, I offer a brief
overview of the Colombian conflict, and of female combatants
there. I then explore how the theories elaborated upon in
Section II may or may not apply to the situation of these women. In Section IV, I briefly review the Peace and Justice Law,
the predominant mechanism of the transitional justice mechanisms in Colombia, with regard to the experience of these women. Rather than present an exhaustive review of transitional
justice mechanisms in the country, in this article I focus only
on particular elements of this law that have particular
resonance in the lives of women combatants. And in Section
V, recognizing that the endeavor of transitional justice is necessarily an imperfect science, I provide a framework for a transitional justice strategy in Colombia that is cognizant of gender
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inclusivity and which attempts to overcome these false dichotomies.
I. WHAT

IS

TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE?

12/07/2011 07:07:40

4. LOUIS BICKFORD, Transitional Justice, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENOCIDE
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 1045, 1045 (Dinah L. Shelton, ed., 2004)
(“Transitional Justice refers to a field of activity and inquiry focused on how
societies address legacies of past human rights abuses, mass atrocity, or other
forms of severe social trauma, including genocide or civil war, in order to
build a more democratic, just or peaceful future.”).
5. In 2005, more than one million ex-combatants participated in DDR
programs in twenty different countries, at a cost of 1.9 billion USD. ALBERT
CARAMES ET AL., ANALYSIS OF DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION (DDR) PROGRAMMES EXISTING IN THE WORLD DURING 2005, at 4 (2006).
6. For an overview of the distinctions between the two endeavors of
DDR and transitional justice, and for a cogent argument that the two endeavors would each benefit from greater coordination, see Lars Waldorf,
Linking DDR and Transitional Justice, in DISARMING THE PAST: TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE AND EX-COMBATANTS 14 (Ana Cutter Patel et al. eds., 2009).
AND
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As countries emerge from years of human rights abuse
and violent conflict, they often struggle to develop methods to
reconcile society and to address the legacy of heinous acts that
have taken place within their borders. These efforts, understood broadly as transitional justice, are concerned with reordering society to promote a more just, less repressive society
that seeks to overcome past trauma, and to account for past
injustice.4 This process often, but not always, is implemented
as a country shifts from an authoritarian regime to one based
on liberal notions of democracy and pluralism. These mechanisms include judicial and non-judicial options, such as truth
and reconciliation commissions, truth commissions (with no
reconciliation as part of the mandate), prosecutions (international or domestic), victim reparations (which may be either
material or symbolic, individual or collective), vetting or lustration (banning perpetrators from public office), or amnesty (either blanket or individualized).
In addition to those practices that fall under the umbrella
of transitional justice programs, over recent decades, conflict
zones throughout the world have witnessed significant reliance
on and funding for reconstruction efforts, specifically through
the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (“DDR”)
of combatants.5 Most scholars distinguish DDR from transitional justice, and view the two as separate processes.6 DDR is
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concerned primarily with former combatants, is implemented
during or immediately after conflict, and is concerned with security alone, whereas transitional justice incorporates a wider
spectrum of individuals, may take years to implement after
conflict, and is concerned with accountability, truth-seeking
and redress for past wrongs.7 Despite these differences, both
processes are oriented toward long-term objectives of reconciliation, stability, and peace, and are often funded by the same
donors, implemented by the same national governments, and
rely on partnerships with same civil society organizations. As a
result of these convergences, increasing numbers of scholars
and practitioners argue that the two processes would both benefit from being implemented in coordination with one another.8 Because of its current and, even more significantly, future relevance within the Colombian process for guerilla who
have yet to demobilize, this article considers the relevance of
DDR as well as other transitional justice mechanisms.
The origins of the modern era of transitional justice are
commonly traced to the Nuremburg trials, although history
provides numerous examples of countries reckoning with corrupt regimes prior to World War II through means that also
qualify as transitional justice.9 A central tenet of most transitional justice mechanisms is that they are implemented during
a finite period spanning two subsequent governments, as a

R
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7. U.N. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Centre, IDDRS Framework, §§ 1.10.2, 6.20.3 (2006), http://www.unddr.org/iddrs/framework.php.
8. For a representative sampling of this perspective, see id., Waldorf,
supra note 6, Kimberly Theidon, Transitional Subjects: The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Colombia, 1 INT’L. J, TRANSITIONAL JUST. 66 (2007), and SERGIO JARAMILLO ET AL., TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
AND DDR: THE CASE OF COLOMBIA (2009), available at http://www.ictj.org/
en/research/projects/ddr/country-cases/2379.html.
9. For a detailed discussion of the historical development of and influences on transitional justice, see Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy,
16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 69, 70–72 (2003). Teitel situates post-World War II
transitional justice within the context of the transitional justice following
World War I, specifically citing the influence of (1) national trials within
Germany that failed to deter the state aggression that followed only decades
later and (2) the economic sanctions levied against Germany, which “came
to be identified as a basis for the sense of economic frustration and resentment that fueled Germany’s role in WWII.” Id. at 72–73.
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country transitions from one political regime to another.10
They are largely born out of necessity and implemented with a
sense of urgency. Leaders and populations of post-conflict
governments sense acutely that there will be an intense and
painful recovery period, and must make difficult decisions
about what the best route forward is for victims and perpetrators of abuse.
II. EXAMINING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

WITH A

GENDERED LENS

The field of transitional justice has remained largely sequestered from feminist critique that has been influential in
shaping the fields of human rights and international law.11
This may be due to the newness of the field, or to the urgency
with which transitional justice mechanisms are typically implemented. Nonetheless, within the past decade, several scholars
have begun to stress the importance of evaluating transitional
justice from a gender-conscious theoretical perspective.12 Ap10. See GUILLERMO O’DONNELL & PHILIPPE C. SCHMITTER, TRANSITIONS
AUTHORITARIAN RULE: TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT UNCERTAIN DEMOCRACIES 5 (1998) (defining transition as the interval between one political
regime and another); see also RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 5 (2000)
(explaining that transition is a finite period defined by a shift in political
orders). It should be noted that, despite the commonly held understanding
that transitional justice requires a change in political power, the endeavor
does not always require a transition of government in order for the mechanisms of transitional justice to be implemented. Oftentimes, a transition or
re-balancing of power is sufficient to pave the way for implementation of
such programs. In other cases, governments may initiate transitional justice
mechanisms before any significant end to the conflict itself is in sight. The
conflict in Colombia represents this last approach; there has been no transition from one abusive regime to a second regime seeking accountability. I
adopt a broader interpretation of what “transitional justice” implies, which
includes not only regime transition but also efforts by a government, such as
that of Colombia, to seek accountability for past and ongoing violence.
11. Vasuki Nesiah, Discussion Lines on Gender and Transitional Justice: An
Introductory Essay Reflecting on the ICTJ Bellagio Workshop on Gender and Transitional Justice, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 799, 799–801 (2006).
12. The International Center on Transitional Justice convened a conference on this topic in 2005 in Bellagio, Italy and published a collection of
essays based on these meetings. See Christine Bell & Catherine O’Rourke,
Does Feminism Need a Theory of Transitional Justice? An Introductory Essay, 1 INT’L
J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 23 (2007) (examining “some of the gender implications of a specifically ‘transitional’ theory of Justice”); see also Fionnuala Nı́
Aoláin, Political Violence and Gender During Times of Transition, 15 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 829, 829 (2006) (analyzing “the multiple ways in which transiFROM
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tional justice processes have conceptualized political violence, and how that
maps onto a gendered understanding of violence experiences and accountability mechanisms in a transitional context”).
13. Men are also victims of sexual abuse, yet this approach would not
consider the explicitly sexual nature of the crimes of rape or sexual enslavement of either men or women.
14. For further discussion on the emergence of criminalization of violence against women, see infra Part II.B.
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plication of a gender critique does not necessarily imply a focus on women’s unique needs, protection of women’s rights,
or increased participation in a post-conflict setting. Instead,
theorists who prefer an analysis that is more gender-aware frequently criticize these emphases.
An examination of the possible theoretical intersections
between gender theory and transitional justice reveals three
approaches. The first approach is a non-feminist one, or one
that posits that gender is irrelevant. It makes no explicit acknowledgment of issues that uniquely affect women and men,
and does not recognize gender arrangements that exist in society. This category is typified by a reliance on civil and political
rights. For example, a non-feminist approach might treat a
victim of torture identically whether he is a man, who has been
electro-shocked during his imprisonment, or a woman, who
has suffered rape or sexual enslavement as part of her imprisonment.13 Or if a guerilla group commits a massacre of civilians, this approach would call for equal attention to all those
who had been harmed, meaning people who had been injured, raped, killed, or had property destroyed.
A second approach to transitional justice is one that is explicitly feminist and, as such, criticizes the lack of attention
within the field of transitional justice to the specific needs of
women. This feminist critique is particularly concerned with
the lack of attention paid to sexual violence within conflict.
This approach maintains the prominence of the civil and political scheme and transposes it onto the crimes that most affect
women. One arena in which a feminist approach to transitional justice has had particular salience has been in the realm
of international criminal justice; feminist influences have
brought about the recognition of crimes such as sexual violence and rape.14 In the examples offered above, this approach understands the female victim’s abuse in prison as explicitly gender-related, and categorizes the crime as such in le-
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gal terms. With regard to the civilian massacre, this second
approach highlights women who had suffered rape or sexual
violence and categorizes those crimes as violations of human
rights targeted against women.
A third school of thought has emerged that exposes the
limitations of mainstream civil and political approaches to
transitional justice and highlights the gender biases in many
dominant discourses. Throughout this article I refer to this
emerging body of scholarship as the gender-oriented approach to transitional justice.15 These gender-oriented theorists examine how conflict affects both men and women, how
gender stereotypes and expectations for both men and women
contribute to conflict, and how prevalent transitional justice
mechanisms may be implemented to the ultimate detriment of
women.16 This theoretical approach also attempts to complicate the concept of truth within transitional justice,17 to challenge the presumption that women’s sole experience is one of
victimhood,18 and to highlight the ways in which normative
concepts regarding gender may have a detrimental effect on
men as well as women within the framework of transitional justice.19 In the case of torture or rape victims, this approach
might call for attention to the ways in which normative concepts of gender may impact the choices that perpetrators of
torture or rape may make in committing human rights abuses.
It may also highlight that despite the different nature of the
abuse suffered by each the man and the woman, both may ex31113-nyi_44-1 Sheet No. 58 Side A
12/07/2011 07:07:40

15. My characterization here of these scholars as “gender-oriented” is not
meant to imply that they are not “feminist” in nature; rather, the distinction
is meant as an aide to understand the distinction between those scholars
who emphasize that more attention should be paid to gender writ-large, as
opposed to simply paying more attention to women.
16. See, e.g., Eilish Rooney, Engendering Transitional Justice: Questions of Absence and Silence, 3 INT’L J. L. CONTEXT 173 (2007) (analyzing the disparity
between liberal, gender-neutral norms and the underrepresentation of women in the Good Friday Agreement).
17. See, e.g., Fionnula Nı́ Aoláin & Catherine Turner, Gender, Truth and
Transition, 16 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 229, 234 (2007) (noting that truth commissions tend to view female victims solely through the lens of sexual violence).
18. Naomi R. Cahn, Women in Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dilemmas and Directions, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 335, 337 (2006).
19. See, e.g., Brandon Hamber, Masculinity and Transitional Justice: An Exploratory Essay, 1 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 375 (2007) (exploring the role
of “violent masculinity” in transitional justice).
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perience the role of “victim” within conflict, yet neither is unilaterally defined by it.
This article is primarily concerned with understanding
how this most recent gender-oriented approach toward transitional justice might apply to a subject that has not yet been
extensively contemplated by these theorists: the situation of female combatants.20 The existence of female combatants in
conflicts worldwide is a phenomenon that is under-documented and under-analyzed. Consequently, it poses unique
challenges for transitional justice and human rights mechanisms’ treatment of gender issues in many countries throughout the world, including the case study of Colombia examined
here.
A gender-oriented critique of transitional justice reveals
numerous important problems that can arise if transitions to a
post-conflict era are not implemented with an eye toward gender. These criticisms converge around three central concerns,
which I classify as “false dichotomies” inherent in the approach of many transitional justice programs.21 I argue that if
these false dichotomies, which can either be imposed by or

R
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20. Despite the relative lack of attention paid to female combatants
among scholars of transitional justice, there is a fairly broad literature available on this subject from feminist international relations scholars who explore the role that women play in combat, including CYNTHIA ENLOW, DOES
KHAKI BECOME YOU? THE MILITARIZATION OF WOMEN’S LIVES (1988) and FEMINISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE (J. Ann Tickner & Laura Sjoberg eds., 2011). For a recent
important contribution to this body of literature, specifically addressing transitional justice, see Luisa Maria Dietrich Ortega, Transitional Justice and Female Ex-Combatants: Lessons Learned from International Experience, in DISARMING
THE PAST, supra note 6, at 158.
21. The three false dichotomies that I outline in this paper do not encompass all the critiques and concerns of feminist scholars regarding transitional justice. Of particular note, I have only briefly addressed the important
debate over the issue of “gender mainstreaming” and other structural concerns with injecting gender considerations into international human rights
norms, which do not explicitly fall within the three groupings as I have defined them. For more complete discussions of these critiques, see Hilary
Charlesworth, Not Waving but Drowning: Gender Mainstreaming and Human
Rights in the United Nations, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (2005), explaining that
“mainstreaming” obscures areas where gendered inequalities are woven into
the international system, and Julie Mertus, Improving the Status of Women in the
Wake of War: Overcoming Structural Obstacles, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 541
(2003), questioning the assumption that post-conflict gender equality is best
enforced through a system of legally enforceable individual rights.
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perpetuated by transitional justice mechanisms, are not addressed directly, the efficacy of such programs will be severely
hampered. I examine three of these dichotomies in this article, each of which presents unique challenges if they are to be
overcome: (A) the false dichotomy between the “conflict” and
the “post-conflict” era; (B) the public/private dichotomy that
may be transposed onto transitional justice mechanisms and
be perpetuated by them; and (C) the dichotomy between victims and perpetrators within and after conflict.
I first explore each theme in detail in order to describe
the problems that arise and to elucidate why I term each of
these concerns a “false dichotomy” within the context of gender and transitional justice. This backdrop provides a useful
starting point for a more focused examination of the applicability of these theories to the experience of women in combat
generally, and in Colombia specifically.
A. False Dichotomy Between “Conflict” and “Post-Conflict”

R

R
R

12/07/2011 07:07:40

22. Bell & O’Rourke, supra note 12, at 23; see also CHRIS COULTER, BUSH
WIVES AND GIRL SOLDIERS: WOMEN’S LIVES THROUGH WAR AND PEACE IN SIERRA LEONE 7–8 (2009) (indicating that women’s experiences during conflict can often serve as a powerful reminder that war and peace are not mutually exclusive, and that it is never entirely clear where one begins and the
other ends).
23. COULTER, supra note 22.
24. See Nı́ Aoláin, supra note 12 (noting that transitions are usually negotiated by men ignoring the gendered perspective).
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A central theme that unites many feminist critics is unease
with the bifurcation inherent within many transitional justice
schemes. This unease is captured by a provocative question:
what exactly is transitional justice transitioning “from,” and
what it is transitioning “to”?22 Inherent in the concept of a
post-conflict “transition” is the implication of a shift from a
male-defined political violence to a liberal democratic framework.23 If women’s rights are abused during conflict, mainstream transitional justice may seek accountability and retribution for the male actors who violated women’s rights. Yet without an examination of core gender relationships, transitional
justice mechanisms may simply reassert and cement the maleoriented relationships that lead to the conflict in the first
place.24 War is often compartmentalized into two discrete
phases, yet this division does not accurately reflect that under-
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lying social norms regarding violence and gender may exist on
a continuum running through society. Vasuki Nesiah argues
that the temptation to draw a clean line between the conflict
and the post-conflict must be overcome; it is false to believe
that either women or men experience the conflict and postconflict as a sharp binary opposition.25 It is crucial to recognize that women may experience different types of suffering
during and after conflict—in some cases women may view
their situations as improving, in others, as worsening. Regardless, my challenge to the dichotomy of conflict/post-conflict is
intended to put pressure on the notion that with the termination of the “conflict,” so too ends the major period of human
rights abuse that requires accounting for.
One consequence of reconceptualizing war outside of the
boxes of “conflict” and “post-conflict” also demands that scholars revisit the distinction between the “front line” that affects
soldiers, and the “home front” in which civilians reside.26 Increasingly, wars take place not only on a battlefield, but permeate into the hearts of communities, transforming the lives of
soldiers and civilians alike.27 Yet the concept of a “front line”
where war occurs persists, as does the concept that soldiers are
the primary actors. These misconceptions are apparent in the
overly generalized and stereotypical way in which men’s and
women’s roles are often portrayed in discussions of war and
peace.
R
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25. Nesiah, supra note 11, at 801.
26. Anthropological research focusing on war and conflict has reached
the consensus that it is not accurate to speak of a front line in war that affects only professional armies. See, e.g., COULTER, supra note 22 (summarizing anthropological scholarship that argues violence is a continuum running
through social, political, and economic spheres).
27. See Benjamin Valentino et al., “Draining the Sea”: Mass Killing and Guerilla Warfare, 58 INT’L ORG. 375, 375 (2004) (estimating that “between thirteen and twenty-six million civilians have died in civil, international, and colonial wars since 1945,” and highlighting that intentional killing of civilians
during war is often a calculated military strategy designed to combat powerful guerrilla insurgencies). For an exploration of the varied impact of civil
wars on civilian populations globally, see Macartan Humphreys & Jeremy M.
Weinstein, Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil War, 100 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 429, 429 (2006). For a data analysis of the intentional and direct
killing of civilians primarily conducted by non-state actors, see Kristine Eck
& Lisa Hultman, One-Sided Violence Against Civilians in War: Insights from New
Fatality Data, 44 J. PEACE RES. 233, 233 (2007).
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28. Rita Manchanda, Ambivalent Gains in South Asian Conflicts, in THE AFWOMEN IN POST-CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION 99, 117 (Sheila
Meintjes, Anu Pillay & Meredeth Turshen, eds., 2001).
29. See Nı́ Aoláin, supra note 12, at 844 (arguing that a feature of transitional accountability is a focus on public acts and exclusion of private
gendered violence); see also MacKenzie, supra note 2, at 258 (noting that
anthropological research with Sierra Leonean female combatants indicated
that most women felt more constrained in their social and political choices
after the conflict was over than they had during conflict).
TERMATH:
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The false dichotomy between conflict and post-conflict
has a profound impact on the standard transitional justice
model, which relies on an assumption that with the arrival of a
politically-determined end to conflict, so too comes an improvement in the lives of those affected by conflict. Understanding the falsity of this dichotomy raises the controversial
question of whether women’s positions relative to society improve or worsen as a result of conflict. Despite a politically
negotiated ending to conflict, women may perceive their situations to worsen after conflict has supposedly ended. For many
women, the period after violence ends presents new challenges and hardships. Any underlying structural violence that
existed prior to or during conflict is likely to continue in the
“post” conflict era, unless efforts are intentionally made to
modify it. Furthermore, when war breaks down traditional social structures and men leave home to fight, women have consistently adopted greater responsibility. In fact, they may feel
that their circumstances are improved. In Nepal, for instance,
when men left home to fight in the Maoist conflict, their wives
discovered opportunities to farm and plow their own land, and
to assume public positions in a local district council.28 A similar trend occurred in the United States during World War II as
Rosie the Riveter called upon women to contribute publically
to the war effort by working outside the home in positions they
had previously not occupied. For some women, the end of
conflict brings a return to the expected gender roles, and potentially, retribution for women who have defied gender stereotypes. Transitional justice attempts to bring society back to
“normal” and, in doing so, may reassert patriarchy privately
even while re-ordering the public sphere.29
Breaking down the theoretical wall between the “conflict”
and the “post-conflict” is a useful exercise from multiple scholarly perspectives. Legal scholars who promote an “Ordinary
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30. See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as
Ordinary Justice, 117 HARV. L. REV. 761 (2004) (arguing regime transitions
should not be seen as a self-contained subject and that analogies can be
drawn to transitions that occur within consolidated democracies); see also
Bell & O’Rourke, supra note 12, at 35 (evaluating the relevance of other
theories of transitional justice from a feminist perspective).
31. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 30, at 763–64.
32. Coulter, supra note 22, at 8.
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Justice” approach to transitional justice also advance the proposition that the conflict/post-conflict dichotomy of transitional justice is a false one.30 This theory undermines any predictions of an idealist “peace” that transitional justice may
bring. Because regular periods of social division and transition exist even in established democracies, this critique attempts to explode the notion that transitional justice is a “distinctive topic presenting distinctive set of moral and justice dilemmas.”31 Though this critique is not explicitly feminist, it
buttresses the gender-oriented argument that adherence to
this false dichotomy may produce unrealistic expectations and
dangerous side effects within a transitional regime.
Although legal scholars tend to dominate the field of
transitional justice, important findings of other disciplines can
be incorporated as well to promote a more gender-aware transitional justice scheme. The prevalence of lawyers within the
field of transitional justice, coupled with the false impression
that the conflict and post-conflict eras are entirely distinct,
may result in an over-reliance on a rights-based framework that
may not always adequately consider factors such as gender or
culture within a society. Anthropologist Chris Coulter indicates that many of the international organizations and NGOs
that implement post-conflict transitional justice mechanisms
operate from a human rights framework described in legalistic
language.32 This framework, however, may not be accustomed
to in-depth examination of societal or cultural systems of
meaning that exist separately from the context of conflict.
Other disciplines, such as anthropology and sociology, might
be better suited to this task, as they are dedicated to understanding the complexity of social processes. For example, a legal approach may envision a law-based, governmental structure for resolving conflict, but may not take into consideration
pre-existing community based structures that may already exist
to resolve conflict, such as through tribal or community net-
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33. Ratna Kapur, The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric, in 4 FEMINIST LEGAL
STUDIES, CRITICAL CONCEPTS IN LAW 163, 167 (Joanne Conaghan ed., 2009)
(“Gender essentialism refers to the fixing of certain attributes to women . . . .
These essential attributes are considered to be shared by all women and
hence also universal.”).
34. Charlesworth, supra note 21, at 1.
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works. Interdisciplinary work, both among theorists and on
the ground, may lead to fruitful collaboration that avoids some
of the pitfalls of a purely rights-based framework typified by a
legal approach.
Finally, in considering the falsity of the distinction between the “conflict” era and the “post-conflict era” of most
transitional justice mechanisms, another concern regarding
the position of women is the tendency to assume that all women share the same needs and benefit from the same solutions in a post-conflict era. This tendency has been described
as “essentializing” women, who are then grouped as a homogeneous category in order to meet their needs post-conflict.33
Not only does this approach risk negating a multi-layered, diverse experience for women within conflict, but it also risks
tokenizing those women whose voices are audible, while assuming that they speak for all women’s experience during and
after conflict. It is crucial that transitional justice mechanisms
encompass the diversity of women’s experiences, not as uniformly better or worse after the supposed era of conflict is
complete, but as varying from individual to individual. Such a
recognition of the complexity of women’s lives during and after conflict might also prevent transitional justice mechanisms
from relying on essentialized and overbroad characterizations
of “the female experience” during conflict.
The debate surrounding essentialization of women’s
rights presents a paradox that a variety of theorists have grappled with for decades. This debate asks whether it is preferable to specifically protect women’s needs and risk marginalizing them (“sidestreaming” women’s issues), or, whether it is
better to incorporate a consideration of gender into general
human rights norms and all elements of transitional justice
(“gender mainstreaming”).34 Side-streaming relegates women’s issues to the category of “women’s rights,” and separates
them from “human rights,” implying that women are excluded
from the latter category. In this scenario, because women are
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distinguished, conceptually the term “human” may become
equated with “male.” Gender mainstreaming, however, according to Hilary Charlesworth, is at once, “too broad and too
narrow.”35 It is too broad because it descends into rhetoric of
interrogating power imbalances between the genders, but may
not have much effect in the field without a specific prescription for implementation. It is too narrow because it neglects
the distinct struggles that men and women face in and after
conflict.36
B. Public & Private Dichotomies in Transitional Justice
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35. Id. at 13.
36. Julie Mertus, supra note 21, at 551.
37. See generally CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988)
(describing the traditional societal breakdown of men and women’s roles in
which men dominate the public sphere of work outside the home, and women dominate the private sphere of running the household and child-rearing).
38. Nı́ Aoláin, supra note 12, at 847–48.
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Feminist critiques of mainstream transitional justice draw
on a traditional feminist analysis of the public and private dichotomy between men’s space and women’s space.37 Transitional justice mechanisms tend to focus on how rights have
been abused publicly rather than privately. Reconciliation is
approached in a very public manner, whether through trials,
truth commissions, or amnesty hearings. Methods of reconciliation address public crimes, such as rape as a weapon of war,
but do not address private crimes, such as domestic violence.
Disarmament measures in transitional justice entail removing
weapons from the public sphere, yet there is often no public
condemnation of violence or weapons in the private realm.38
The numerous ways in which transitional justice mechanisms
rely on the distinction between public and private space undermine the potential that these mechanisms have to dismantle pre-existing gender norms which exist in society before
conflict begins.
One area in which the dichotomy between public and private is particularly striking is in the realm of sexual violence
against women. Great strides have been made in this arena,
and it is important to recognize how significant these accomplishments have been within the realm of public rights, despite the failings in this area in private rights. Until the end of
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the twentieth century, most human rights bodies largely ignored sexual violence against women, despite the ubiquity of
rape and other sexual violence especially during times of
war.39 During times of political crisis, women’s bodies are
often transformed into battlegrounds for competing ideologies.40 Opponents may target women’s bodies for attack, demonstrating military strength through a capacity to violate the
mothers, sisters, wives, or daughters of their opponents. In addition, women are generally disproportionately affected by
conflict.41 They bear the burden of conflict when they lose
loved ones who may also be a source of financial support,
when they suddenly become the heads of families who may be
displaced from their homes by fighting or occupation, when
they must take on the responsibility of providing for a family in
the context of a society that may not afford women equal financial rights, and when they are directly targeted as victims of
violence in conflict.42
As various human rights instruments were adopted over
the last century, the problem of violence against women,
whether in the public or the private sphere, remained unaddressed until relatively recently. As recently as 1979, when the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW)43 was adopted, the question of how
to combat violence against women was not even part of the
discussion.44 The Convention does not address violence
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39. KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 3, at 180.
40. See generally Kelly D. Askin, The Quest for Post-Conflict Gender Justice, 41
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 509 (2003) (arguing that violence against women
in conflict situations is often the result of deliberate policy and can reflect
the ideology of combatants).
41. Bell & O’Rourke, supra note 12, at 25; Nı́ Aoláin, supra note 12, at
830 (observing that women and children comprise the vast majority of those
affected by conflict); see also Askin, supra note 40, at 512 (noting that victims
of sexual violence during conflicts are disproportionately women and girls).
42. Cf. Askin, supra note 40, at 515 (noting contributions of women during and after conflict to rebuild and maintain their families and society in
the face discrimination and other obstacles).
43. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, UN Doc. A/RES/34/180 (Dec. 18, 1979)
[hereinafter CEDAW].
44. KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 3, at 168.
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against women but instead focuses on issues of discrimination
and equality.45
The issue of violence against women finally began to gain
prominence when international networks of feminists demanded an end to impunity for violations of sexual violence
during times of war.46 Women’s groups from the across the
world coalesced around this mission,47 and women’s rights advocates began to promote the application of a human rights
methodology (focusing on civil and political rights) onto the
issue of sexual violence.48 In 1995, the UN Conference on
Women in Beijing declared violence against women to be one
of the convention’s dominant issues of concern.49 This cursory historical review documenting the upsurge in attention
paid to public sexual violence against women demonstrates
just how radical these demands were as recently as the turn of
the twentieth century. This increase in attention paid to public sexual violence against women was a sea change in the spectrum of human rights and huge triumph for women’s rights
advocates internationally. This dramatic shift is apparent not
only in documents such as the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, but is also evident in the jurisprudence of
R
R
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45. CEDAW, supra note 43; KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 3, at 166.
46. See KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 3, at 171–72 (arguing that the concept
of “violence against women” was constructed and popularized by international feminist networks). The issue of violence against women was first publicly discussed in an international forum in 1976 at the First International
Tribune on Crimes Against Women in Brussels. Id. at 175.
47. See Elisabeth Friedman, Women’s Human Rights: The Emergence of a
Movement, in WOMEN’S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 18, 18 & 21 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995) (describing
the development of the international women’s rights groups and the incorporation of violence against women as a target of human rights law).
48. Charlotte Bunch, Women’s Rights as Human Rights: Toward a Re-Vision
of Human Rights, 12 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 486, 493 (1990).
49. Fourth World Conference on Women, Sept. 4–15, 1995, Beijing Declaration,¶ 29, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1 (1996). The rise of this concern internationally is also reflected in the adoption of the UN General Assembly Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women and the
Organization of American States’ adoption of the Inter-American convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women, both of which occurred in 1994. Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (Feb.
23, 1994); Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and
Eradication of Violence Against Women, June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1534.
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international criminal tribunals,50 in the Rome Statute adopting an International Criminal Court,51 and in a variety of resolutions and comments adopted by the United Nations.
Following this hard-fought feminist victory, many of the
subsequent generation of feminist theorists have rejected the
categorization of sexual violence as the singular human rights
issue facing women.52 Now that human rights law recognizes
violence against women as a major rights-category, these theorists stress that sexual violence is not the sole form in which
women suffer abuse during times of armed conflict.53 Certainly, conflict-related sexual violence continues to be an enormous problem facing women, yet the nearly singular focus on
this concern may have the effect of crowding out non-conflict
related or private sexual violence. Sexual violence, when it is
perpetrated as a method of public political violence, is chastised, yet private sexual abuse is left untouched by transitional
mechanisms.54 This trend risks ghettoizing domestic sexual
abuse into a separate realm, unrelated to sexual violence that
occurs publicly. This pattern is dangerous due to the fact that
violence within many societies may exist on a continuum, perhaps increasing during conflict or perhaps decreasing during
conflict, yet it is perpetually present. If transitional justice
truly aims to reorient society toward a safer and more secure
reality for all its members, both private and political sexual vio-
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50. E.g., Kelly D. Askin, Sexual Violence in Decisions and Indictments of the
Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals: Current Status, 93 Am. J. Int’l. L. 97, 99–100
(1999). For example, in the case of Jean-Paul Akesyu, the ICTR established
that rape can be considered an element of a genocidal campaign, Prosecutor
v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 706–07, 731–34, and that
rape can constitute torture, id. ¶¶ 597, 687.
51. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 3. Both Article 7 (crimes against humanity) and Article 8 (war
crimes) specifically delineate crimes regarding sexual violence. Id. art. 7–8.
Article 36 (on qualifications, nominations and expertise of judges) indicates
that among other qualifications, judges should have expertise in issues such
as violence against women and children. Id. art. 36. Additionally, the creation of a Victim and Witness Unit is an example of the evolution of creative
approaches to addressing sexual violence. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 339–41 (2011).
52. For a description of the questions raised as scholars have begun to
question the preoccupation with sexual violence to the exclusion of other
issues relevant to women, see Nesiah, supra note 11, at 806.
53. Id. at 805.
54. Nı́ Aoláin, supra note 12, at 844.
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55. Id. at 841.
56. See Nesiah, supra note 11, at 805 (referencing Afghan women who
were interviewed about the effects of sexual violence and who preferred to
discuss challenges of feeding their families). But see KECK & SIKKINK, supra
note 3, at 179 (referencing interviews with poor women in rural India who
stated that the one thing that could improve their lives was an end to domestic abuse).
57. S.C. Res. 1325, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (October 31, 2000) (calling
on states to protect women and children from sexual violence and prosecute
crimes of sexual violence).
58. Id. ¶¶ 1–2
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lence, as well as the inter-relation between the two, must be
addressed in transitional justice measures.
Additionally, the dominance of sexual violence within
transitional justice mechanisms may reflect an inherent bias of
the transitional justice and human rights worlds toward addressing political and human rights as opposed to social and
economic rights.55 This may result in marginalization of socioeconomic issues, such as access to health care, or gendered
aspects of displacement, which some women may find more
relevant on a daily basis than sexual violence. As highlighted
by one scholar, no “third-world consensus” exists regarding
which issues are of primary import to women in the developing world.56 As futile as it may be to create a hierarchy of
abuses experienced by women, these highly divergent perspectives serve as reminders that uniformity of experience cannot
be assumed among women in conflict.
The United Nations has made marked progress toward international recognition of public sexual violence during conflict, most prominently through UN Security Council Resolution 1325, adopted in 2000.57 This was the first resolution
passed recognizing the disproportionate impact of conflict on
women. It calls for visibility for women in the public sphere,
inter alia, the increased participation of women in decision
making related to the prevention, management and resolution
of conflict.58
Despite the significance of its aims, Resolution 1325 falls
vulnerable to several critiques due to its reliance on, and perpetuation of, a gendered dichotomy between the public and
private spheres. First, its focus on public sexual violence neglects other essential economic and social needs that women
and communities may view as more pressing concerns during
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59. Nı́ Aoláin highlights that, although many transitional justice mechanisms’ focus is on violations of political and civil rights, some women stress
that violations of social and economic rights are more acutely experienced.
This critique is equally relevant when examining Resolution 1325. Nı́ Aoláin, supra note 12.
60. S.C. Res. 1325, supra note 57, ¶ 1.
61. Hilary Charlesworth, The Hidden Gender of International Law, 16 TEMP.
INT’L & COMP. L. J. 93, 94–95 (2002).
62. Fionnuala Nı́ Aoláin & Eilish Rooney, Underenforcement and Intersectionality: Gendered Aspects of Transition for Women, 1 INT’L. J. TRANSITIONAL
JUST. 338, 350 (2007).
63. Dianne Otto, A Sign of “Weakness”? Disrupting Gender Certainties in the
Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325, 13 MICH. J. GENDER & L.
113, 140 (2007).
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conflict.59 Secondly, although Resolution 1325 aspires to recognize that women can play important roles in both the public
and private spheres, in doing so, it may underrepresent the
diversity of the female experience. For example, it urges that
states “increase representation of women in all decision making levels in national, regional and international institutions
for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict.”60
The conscientious inclusion of women in the public sphere is
an important starting point, yet this approach risks the assumption that inclusion of a woman in decision making will
represent “women’s issues,” when perhaps a highly-educated
upper class white woman may have a vastly different experience than, for example, a poor, illiterate, indigenous woman.
This approach, derisively referred to as the “add women and
stir” solution, is not enough of a change to ameliorate sexism.61 It risks falling into the conceptual trap of essentializing
the ‘woman’ who is absent,62 assuming that any woman can
represent all women. Finally, Resolution 1325 emphasizes women’s participation in the “formal” sphere, yet its drafters offer no explanation as to why adding gender in this context
might be important. Through a close examination of the
records from the Open Debate of the Security Council on Women, Peace and Security, Diane Otto demonstrates that there
was an implicit assumption throughout the debate that the rationale behind including women in a formal sense relied on
an understanding of gender in a biological sense, rather than
in an analytical sense.63 Hence, the Security Council’s failure
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64. For an in-depth analysis of Security Council Resolution 1325, see id.
113–75.
65. See FIONA C. ROSS, BEARING WITNESS: WOMEN AND THE TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION IN SOUTH AFRICA (2003) for a detailed assessment of how a focus on apartheid had the effect of eclipsing women’s experiences and silencing important components of their experiences. See also Nı́
Aoláin & Turner, supra note 17, at 261 (describing the focus on sexual violence causing the marginalization of women’s other experiences).
66. Nı́ Aoláin, supra note 12, at 830–31.
67. Ross, supra note 62, at 88–89.
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to “fully embrace a framework of gender equality.”64 Inclusion
of women as proposed by Resolution 1325 is no guarantee that
the interests of all women will be represented, even if they are
intentionally brought into the realm of the public sphere.
The public/private dichotomy is similarly problematic
with regard to the implications of public testimony during
mechanisms such as Truth and Reconciliation Commissions
(TRCs).65 Many public commissions encourage female victims
to testify about crimes of sexual violence they have suffered.
Yet the men and women of traditional societies may indeed
ostracize or reject women who have been raped, and although
it may be acceptable for these women to discuss sexual violence at a TRC, it is not always acceptable once they return to
their families in the private sphere. Ironically, TRCs may have
the effect of exacerbating social stigma directed at a rape victim. As Fionnuala Nı́ Aoláin explains, “[T]he forms of accountability sought in the post-conflict/post-regime environment reflect the gender biases that manifest in the prior context.”66 Although a post-conflict regime may attempt to
overcome a societal bias directed at women who have experienced sexual violation, occasionally the method utilized to accomplish this goal may only retrench the pre-conflict gender
bias.
The public nature of truth and reconciliation commissions may result in exclusions of women’s experiences that reflect a longstanding human rights hierarchy of privileging the
more “public” political and civil rights over “private” economic
and social rights. Research demonstrates that some women
have been frustrated with their experiences testifying in such
settings.67 Women explain that although they were asked repeatedly to testify about public crimes including sexual violence, the abuses that most dramatically affected their lives
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were those that occurred in the private sphere, such as domestic violence, the loss of loved ones, displacement, or conflictinduced poverty.68 Additionally, logistics of participating in a
commission may preclude women’s involvement; the simple
act of traveling to testify may be difficult for a woman who
cares for children, or may actually be dangerous for witnesses
for whom adequate precautions are not taken. For instance, a
Rwandan woman who testified at the ICTR trial of Jean-Paul
Akayesu was killed shortly thereafter.69 The predominance of
the public sphere in transitional justice efforts, therefore, may
sideline women’s most relevant accounts of injustice.
C. False Dichotomy Between Victims and Perpetrators
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68. Nı́ Aoláin & Turner supra note 17 at 25.
69. See Alex Obote-Odora, Rape and Sexual Violence in International Law:
ICTR Contribution, 12 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 136, 144 (2005) (noting
the difficulties of traveling from Rwanda to Arusha and the suspicious deaths
of witnesses after testifying); see also Connie Walsh, Witness Protection, Gender
and the ICTR, COALITION FOR WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONFLICT SITUATIONS,
http://www.womensrightscoalition.org/site/advocacyDossiers/
rwanda/witnessProtection/report_en.php (last visited Oct. 15, 2011).
70. Nesiah, supra note 11, at 801; Chris Coulter, Feminist Review, Female
Fighters in the Sierra Leone War: Challenging the Assumptions? 88 FEMINIST REV.
54, 66 (2008). Coulter is just one example of an anthropologist who also
challenges these presumptions. She explains, “The oppositional concepts of
victim and perpetrator, and the attached notion of victims having no agency,
are so all-pervasive in humanitarian discourse that they are difficult to completely avoid.” Id.
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Transitional justice mechanisms may operate based on a
model of victims and perpetrators that assumes women to be
passive victims a priori, rather than actors.70 While women’s
human rights violations certainly should not be ignored, this
characterization is problematic because the equation of female
identity with victimhood denies women a broader and more
nuanced role within society. Transitional justice seeks accountability for the (usually) female victims of sexual violence,
positing women in the pre-conflict role of victim, and in the
post-conflict role of victim to be compensated or avenged.
This dynamic isolates women’s experiences and denies them
the multiple subject positions that they may occupy in reality—
a woman may have been raped, but perhaps she prioritizes
(and takes pride in) her role as head of a household caring for
several children. This tendency to equate women and victims
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reinforces a binary relationship: if women are victims, men are
perpetrators. This positioning denies men a broader and
more nuanced spectrum of roles that they may occupy in a
conflict or post-conflict setting; they, too, may be victims of
human rights abuse.71
Women occupy multiple and varied roles within conflicts
across the globe: they are human rights advocates, politicians,
judges, fighters, genocidaires, victims, pawns, mothers, and
prosecutors.72 Whether motivated by idealism, racism, fear, or
other impetuses, in these roles women have occasionally
demonstrated a capacity for violence, and the response of the
international human rights community represents a simultaneous discomfort and fascination with these cases. Although women in numerous armed struggles have taken up arms, women’s involvement as combatants tends to be ignored by the
press and by human rights analyses. Public discomfort with
unexpected women’s roles is perhaps most strikingly demonstrated by the international attention paid to the prosecution
of Pauline Nyiramasuhuko at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Nyiramasuhuko, the former Minister of Family and Women’s Affairs of Rwanda, was the first woman to be charged and convicted of crimes including genocide and rape as a crime against humanity at the ICTR, for her
role in inciting and overseeing the mass rape of the women of
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71. Transitional justice scholarship has addressed this question previously, specifically with regard to child soldiers, who are arguably both victims
and perpetrators of crimes. See, e.g., Nienke Grossman, Rehabilitation or Revenge? Prosecuting Child Soldiers, for Human Rights Violations, 38 GEO. J. INT’L.
L. 323 (2007) (arguing that children under eighteen who participate in conflicts should be treated as victims not perpetrators). Furthermore, conflicts
in which boys have been recruited as child soldiers also raise important questions regarding the role of hyper-masculinity in promoting conflict. See generally, Fionnula Nı́ Aoláin et al., Masculinities and Child Soldiers in Post-Conflict
Societies (Univ. of Minn. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper
No. 10-57), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1804564 (applying “theories and constructs from masculinities studies to address . . . issues that arise from the deployment of child soldiers in armed
conflicts”).
72. See, e.g., WOMEN WAGING PEACE, PREPARING FOR PEACE: THE CRITICAL
ROLE OF WOMEN IN COLOMBIA 20, 22–23 (2004), available at http://www.hunt
alternatives.org/download/17_preparing_for_peace_the_critical_rose_of_
women_in_colombia.pdf (discussing some of the roles occupied by women
in conflicts).
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73. Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, Case No. ICTR-98-42-T, Judgment and
Sentence, (June 24, 2011); Peter Landesman, A Woman’s Work, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Sept. 15, 2002, at 82; Askin, supra note 40, at 513, n.29.
74. See generally Stephanie K. Wood, A Woman Scorned for the “Least Condemned” War Crime: Precedent and Problems with Prosecuting Rape as a Serious War
Crime in the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER
& L. 274, 287 (2004).
75. Hamber, supra note 19, at 378.
76. Id. at 379.
77. See Cynthia Enloe, All the Men Are in the Militias, All the Women Are
Victims: The Politics of Masculinity and Femininity in Nationalist Wars, in THE
WOMEN AND WAR READER 50 (Lois Ann Lorentzen & Jennifer Turpin ed.,
1998) (studying the experiences of one Sarajevan man to reveal the
gendered ethnic and nationalist processes shaping his actions); see also
Theidon, supra note 8, at 75–76.
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the town of Butare in 1994.73 Presumably because the charges
against her were rare, her case received a disproportionate
level of attention compared to the dozens of men in the
Rwandan government who bore similar levels of responsibility
for promoting the systematic rape, torture, and murder of
thousands of women.74
As reassessment of women’s roles within conflict becomes
necessary, so, too, do men’s roles demand closer examination.75 Unsurprisingly, scholars have discovered that men experience conflict and gender in myriad ways; that “masculinities are not uniform and that power relations exist within
them.”76 Men and women are both affected by conflict in ways
that may challenge preconceived notions about how genders
are supposed to behave. Social class, education, and life experience may be more determinative than gender in creating options for individuals in conflict. For example, a young man
who is university-educated might have more options available
to him and will be less likely to join an armed group than his
poor, uneducated counterpart.
Case studies demonstrate that men and women alike express feelings of passivity with regard to the nationalistic conflicts transpiring in their countries.77 Increased attention to
the way that men experience violence and conflict further supports the proposal that young men’s formative experiences
can influence how they relate to armed conflict. Bosnian Serb
males who were tried for rape and crimes against humanity at
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
describe growing up with a collective memory of Muslim op-
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pression of Serbs.78 Cynthia Enloe describes an interview with
one prisoner who grew up understanding his lack of success in
his professional and romantic life as a result of Muslim oppression. This young man fell into a Serbian armed group and
with little apparent political consciousness, participated in the
rape and murder of Muslim women. Enloe suggests that he
easily transposed his childhood feelings of victimhood onto
the conflict at hand, leading him to participate in these
crimes.79 In Colombia as well, both young men and young women may experience a sense of helplessness and lack of options—described very much as a type of victimhood—that propel them to take up arms.80 Depending on the situation, both
men and women may identify as victims, perpetrators, or may
experience ambivalence about identifying with these roles.
The tendency to categorize women as victims resorts to essentialization of women. Perhaps ironically, feminists, in their
struggle to raise awareness of issues facing some women, are
also guilty of these over-generalizations.81 Awareness of the
complicated nuances inherent in using the term “victim” can
lead to richer interpretation of conflict.
III. CONFLICT, GENDER AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
IN COLOMBIA
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78. Enloe, supra note 77, at 58.
79. Id.
80. Theidon, supra note 8, at 75.
81. See Kapur, supra note 33, for a detailed characterization of feminist
political discourses that have resorted to essentialization of women as victims
and the problematic nature of this analysis. Kapur challenges feminists to
transcend equating females with the victim subject and encourages disruption of gender and cultural norms that are widespread.
82. A country’s choice of transitional justice mechanisms are often directly informed by the type of injustice endemic to a particular conflict, and
by the societal processes that lead to conflict in the first place. See Teitel,
supra note 10, at 6 (“[W]hat is deemed just [in a transitional justice context]
is contingent on and informed by prior injustice.”).
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The Colombian context provides fertile ground on which
to examine how the three false dichotomies, developed above,
affect the nature of armed conflict. Recognizing the intrinsic
connection between the specific injustices of conflict and the
transitional justice measures implemented post-conflict,82 this
section examines some of the gender-related attributes of Co-
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lombia’s conflict. In particular, it highlights the role of the
estimated twenty-five to fifty percent of Colombia’s combatants
who are female.83 Yet the picture presented with regard to
these female combatants is incomplete without an understanding of the ways in which gender dynamics play out in Colombia’s conflict and put pressures on both women and men, influencing the way in which both genders are involved in and
affected by conflict. Here, I focus on the conflict in Colombia
as the primary paradigm for evaluating the relevance of gender-critical theories of transitional justice. I hope to demonstrate that lessons learned regarding societal roles, expectations and presumptions dominated by gender can affect both
men and women, both during and after conflict. Therefore, I
argue, these lessons and the subsequent importance of considering the way in which transitional justice can impose or reinforce gender constructs are applicable to multiple conflict situations worldwide, including those in which there are no female combatants.
I first offer a brief synopsis of the conflict in Colombia
and the participation of women as fighters. I then examine
the participation of Colombian women in light of the three
false dichotomies described above which a gender-oriented
perspective can reveal. The Colombian context demonstrates
how these trends can affect the development of a conflict and,
further, how they might play out in a post-conflict era.

Colombia’s armed conflict has lasted longer than any
other in the Western Hemisphere.84 It has internally displaced nearly four million people, second only to the conflict
in the Sudan.85 During much of this time, the conflict has
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83. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 53 (considering female
membership of FARC based on interviews of former combatants).
84. Christopher Welna, Colombia’s Triple Challenge: Peace, Democracy, and
Human Rights, in PEACE, DEMOCRACY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN COLOMBIA 3, 6
(Christopher Welna & Gustavo Gallón eds., 2007).
85. INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING GRP., INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT:
GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF TRENDS IN 2007 6(2008), available at http://www.internal-displacement.org/publications/global-overview-2010.pdf.
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caused the deaths of over 700 civilians each month.86 Estimates as to the overall number of conflict-related casualties
vary, yet most estimates cite between 70,000-120,000 casualties.87
The backdrop of the current conflict was a period called
La Violencia (1948–1953) when two political parties competed
for political supremacy.88 They agreed upon a power-sharing
government in 1958 that placated the political majority, yet
did not include the ultra-left wing communist factions. The
exclusion of these factions sparked the rise of leftist guerilla
groups, including the most prominent, the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia) and the ELN (Ejército de
Liberación Nacional).89 The FARC advocates for social protection for lower classes, agricultural reform, and local autonomy.90 FARC promotes its mission through guerilla warfare
consisting of conquest of territory, kidnappings, and occasional direct combat with government troops.91 In response to
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86. Marc Chernick, Negotiating Peace Amid Multiple Forms of Violence: The
Protracted Search for a Settlement to the Armed Conflicts in Colombia, in COMPARATIVE PEACE PROCESSES IN LATIN AMERICA 159 (Cynthia J. Arnson ed., 1999).
87. See Amnesty Int’l, Colombia: Scarred Bodies, Hidden Crimes, Sexual Violence Against Women in the Armed Conflict, 7, AI Index AMR 23/040/2004 (Oct.
13, 2004), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR23/
040/2004 (claiming more than 70,000 conflict-related deaths occurred in
1984–2004 period). Estimates vary as to what the overall totals are of casualties in Colombia’s conflict, largely due to difficulty in determining which
casualties should be considered “conflict-related.” One recent survey estimates that there have been over 120,000 conflict-related casualties between
1964 and 2003. DIEGO FERNANDO OTERO PRADA, LAS CIFRAS DEL CONFLICTO
COLOMBIANO 44 (2007).
88. The Colombian Liberal and Conservative Parties were the two parties
at the source of the conflict. For a comprehensive summary of this beginning phase of conflict in Colombia, see MARY ROLDÁN, BLOOD AND FIRE: La
Violencia in Antioquia, Colombia, 1946–1953 (2002).
89. Herbert Tico Braun, “¡Que haiga paz!”: The Cultural Context of Conflict
in Colombia, in PEACE, DEMOCRACY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN COLOMBIA, supra
note 84, at 27.
90. Keith Stanski, Terrorism, Gender, and Ideology: A Case Study of Women
Who Join the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), in 1 THE MAKING OF
A TERRORIST: RECRUITMENT, TRAINING AND ROOT CAUSES 136, 139 (2005).
91. Daniel Garcı́a-Peña Jaramillo, Colombia: In Search of a New Model for
Conflict Resolution, in PEACE, DEMOCRACY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN COLOMBIA,
supra note 84, at 105 (following its eighth conference in 1993, FARC gave
higher priority to expanding its territorial presence and increasing its finances through kidnappings and taxation).
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a perceived incapacity or unwillingness of the government to
protect its citizens adequately from the guerrilla groups, various paramilitary groups formed, which have sporadically benefited from state sponsorship.92 When the various paramilitary
groups joined forces in 1997 under the umbrella group of the
AUC (Auto-Defensas Unidas de Colombia), they were already notorious for rampant violations of human rights and financially
dependent on narco-trafficking.93 Since the mid-1980s, the
FARC has also supported its revolutionary efforts with revenue
from narcotics sales.94
Several Colombian administrations have attempted to negotiate peace deals with these armed groups. Most notably, former President Andres Pastrana ceded a large territory of land
to the FARC in 1998, yet failed to negotiate a settlement. Alvaro Uribe, President from 2002-2010, took a hard line with
the FARC and refused to negotiate. Uribe did, however, engage with the paramilitaries, most recently in the form of the
controversial Peace and Justice Law. Under this law the AUC
officially demobilized, though some paramilitaries still remain
active.
B. Women as Combatants in Colombia
All non-governmental armed political groups in Colombia
have utilized female fighters.95 Although the paramilitaries do
include some women among their ranks, the guerillas are
much more predominately female: of the FARC,96 between

R

R

R

31113-nyi_44-1 Sheet No. 68 Side A
12/07/2011 07:07:40

92. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE “SIXTH DIVISION,” MILITARYPARAMILITARY TIES AND U.S. POLICY IN COLOMBIA (2001), available at http://
www.hrw.org/reports/2001/colombia/6theng.pdf (studying the relationship between three Colombian Army brigades and paramilitaries).
93. Garcı́a-Peña Jaramillo, supra note 91, at 106.
94. See Álvaro Camacho Guizado & Andrés López Restrepo, From Smugglers to Drug Lords to Traquetos, in PEACE, DEMOCRACY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN
COLOMBIA, supra note 84, at 80 (observing that a 1984 seizure of a cocaine
laboratory was used by U.S. Ambassador Lewis Tambs to publically announce FARC’s involvement in drug trafficking and sales).
95. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 53.
96. Great discrepancy exists between the number of FARC combatants
according to FARC and according to the government. Compare Jeremy McDermott, Colombia’s Rebels: A Fading Force? BBC NEWS (Feb. 1, 2008), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7217817.stm (citing the Colombian government’s figures that the 2008 number of FARC is between six and eight thousand), with Gary Leech, Interview with FARC Commander Raúl Reyes, COLOMBIA
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twenty-five and fifty percent are female.97 Although the
FARC’s senior command is all men, several women have become “comandantes,” comparable to the rank of officer.98
The FARC actively works to recruit women to its ranks, highlighting its revolutionary Marxist mission; FARC’s website “invites [all women] to participate in our just revolutionary fight
for a New Colombia with social justice, for better living dignity
and independence.”99 There are reports of women and girls
being forced to join the FARC, yet precise data on forced recruitment are unavailable. Anecdotal evidence, interviews,
and anthropological research indicates that the majority of women and girls make a conscious choice to become guerillas.100
Similarly to young men who make this choice, young women
often view becoming combatants as the best of a dismal array
of alternatives for poor people with few options, rather than as
a statement of idealism.101
History provides several isolated examples of females
bearing arms, including Joan of Arc and Eleanor of Aquitaine,
but women who fight in combat have remained the exception
rather than the rule. Still, particularly in movements that advocate revolution, or that seek liberation from colonial or repressive regimes, it is not uncommon to find a high percentage of female participation.102 These women exemplify the attempt to leave the private sphere of the home with which
women are typically associated, and to enter the public world

R

R
R

12/07/2011 07:07:40

R

31113-nyi_44-1 Sheet No. 68 Side B

JOURNAL (July 12, 2007), http://www.colombiajournal.org/colombia259.htm
(indicating FARC commander Raúl Reyes claimed FARC to have 18,000 active members).
97. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 53.
98. Jeremy McDermott, Colombia’s Female Fighting Force, BBC NEWS, (Jan.
4, 2002), http://new.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1742217.stm.
99. Keith Stanski, supra note 90, at 139–40.
100. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 35.
101. Id.
102. Women have participated in irregular forces of countries including:
Colombia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Kosovo, Sierra Leone,
Uganda, Mozambique, Angola, Liberia, South Africa, Peru, and Palestinian
fighters in Lebanon and Israeli-Occupied Territories. Judith Gardam and
Michelle Jarvis, Women and Armed Conflict: The International Response to the Beijing Platform for Action, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2000) (“In recent
times women and young girls have fought in many conflicts including South
Africa, Mozambique, El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Eritrea, and with Palestinian fighters in Lebanon and the Israeli-occupied territories”); THE AFTERMATH, supra note 28, at 29, 22, 90, 101, 113–14.
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103. A photograph depicting an unidentified Sandanista female fighter,
smiling while nursing an infant and carrying a rifle over her shoulder, was
widely circulated by the FSLN during the Nicaraguan revolution as a symbol
of Sandanista dedication to female equality. Orlando Valenzuela, Miliciana
de Waswalito (1984) (on file with author).
104. Sandra Jordan, Girls Go to War as Colombia’s Frontline Killers, THE OBSERVER, (July 14, 2002), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/jul/14/
sandrajordan.theobserver.
105. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 56. These dynamics are reflected in conflicts across the globe. For example, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, a Congolese girl who willingly joined an armed group at age
twelve explained that “when the men [in the Interhamwe] were pillaging
people’s villages, they would rape women. But at that time they wouldn’t
take us with them.” MATT HOBSON, SAVE THE CHILDREN, FORGOTTEN CASUALTIES OF WAR: GIRLS IN ARMED CONFLICT 6 (2005).
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of armed combat. Many of these groups have made claims—
on the surface—of gender equality. In Latin America, the legacy of female fighters is particularly glorified among the poor
of the countryside, famously demonstrated by an image of a
Nicaraguan Sandanista toting a gun while breastfeeding her
baby.103
Within Colombian armed groups, the degree to which
men and women achieve equality varies by region. In some
forces, women train and fight combat missions alongside men.
Despite this, it is invariably the women in the rebel camp who
cook and clean.104 Though it may appear inconsistent, many
of the groups that recruit women as fighters are also the worst
perpetrators of sexual violence against civilian women. Within
the FARC, despite the articulated policy of non-tolerance for
rape and overt sexual harassment, it has been documented
that this policy holds for rank-and-file but not necessarily for
commanders.105 Women perform as deadly fighters and assassins, but there are many contexts in which women do not function as equals.
Despite the presence of these women fighters, many
human rights groups focus only on the victimization and
targeting of women. For instance, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) identifies four central
manifestations of violence that affect women within Colombia’s armed conflict. These manifestations are: (1) women or
their families are direct targets of physical, psychological, and
sexual violence; (2) women are forcibly displaced; (3) women
are forcibly recruited which invariably results in sexual or re-
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106. INTER-AM. COMM’N ON H.R., VIOLENCE AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
WOMEN IN THE ARMED CONFLICT IN COLOMBIA, OEA/Ser.L./V/II., doc. 67 iii
(2006), http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/ColombiaMujeres06eng/TOC.
htm.
107. See id. at 33–35 for isolated paragraphs dealing with sexual abuse of
female recruits.
108. Id. at 88.
109. Id.
110. Cf. MacKenzie, supra note 2 (criticizing the narrow perceptions of
human rights organizations studying the conflict in Sierra Leone). MacKenzie also argues that, despite the important role played by NGOs of highlighting conflict-related violence against women, these reports have also perpetuated the impression that women are victims and not actors in conflict. Id.
111. Amnesty Int’l, supra note 87, at 12.
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productive abuse; (4) women are objects of social control exerted by guerilla groups over conflict regions.106 Each of these
manifestations of violence against women reflects abuses of
human rights, yet this list fails to reflect the overlap between
the ways in which women may be victims of human rights
abuse and also may be perpetrators of abuses.
In addition to the IACHR, hundreds of human rights organizations have published reports and advocacy papers on
the impact of the conflict in Colombia on women, yet very few
address the status of the women who have fought as combatants. In its 102-page report, the IACHR devotes one page to
women who are forcibly or voluntarily recruited, and who then
experience sexual abuse.107 The report acknowledges the difficulty “in distinguishing among the forced and non-forced recruitment.”108 Yet, it describes recruitment tactics that coerce
young women and girls to join, but does not allow for the possibility that a woman might choose to join combat willingly.109
Although the final conclusions of these human rights organizations are important, they ignore the precarious role of these
women fighters.110 Certainly the overall number of women affected by the sexual violence is much larger than the number
of female fighters; Amnesty International claims that between
sixty and seventy percent of Colombian women experience
sexual violence in their lives.111 Most human rights reports include the word victim in the title, but the image of a “victim”
wearing army fatigues and carrying an AK47 may be difficult to
reconcile.
This difficult intersection of identities, of an individual as
woman and as soldier, provides fertile ground for understand-
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ing conflict in Colombia. In turn, transitional justice mechanisms that address the needs of female combatants must interrogate what it means to be both a woman and a soldier in Colombia. Furthermore, these mechanisms shed light on the
fact that gender dynamics affecting not only women, but also
men, may be perilously ignored within post-conflict mechanisms.
1. False Dichotomy Between “Conflict” and “Post-Conflict”:
Sexualization of Conflict Violence
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112. Id. (author’s translation).
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“Young man, are you bored?”112
These words accompany a photo of a fatigue-clothed girl,
beckoning Colombian boys to join the army in a governmentsponsored advertisement. On the other side of the conflict,
Colombia’s guerilla groups also solicit young men by luring
them with attractive young girls. A website promoting the
FARC displays images of young couples in fatigues, romantically involved in the jungles of Colombia, fighting for a radical
leftist cause, seeking to liberate Colombia from a corrupt government.
Although these manipulations of sexuality can be interpreted as superficial recruiting tactics, I suggest that they are
reflective of the larger role that gender plays within Colombian society, and are intimately intertwined with violent conflict. Violence that occurs within the context of conflict may
be more pronounced, yet the gendered origins of conflict-violence are the same as the gendered origins of violence that
permeates society regardless of conflict. Transitional justice
mechanisms may be designed to address violence that occurs
within the artificial timeframe of a “conflict” period, yet as I
demonstrate below, violence within Colombian society, exists
on a continuum and cannot be isolated within a period labeled as conflict. Attempts to distinguish the violence that occurs during conflict as unconnected to daily societal violence
reinforces a false dichotomy between conflict and post-conflict
violence. Unless transitional justice mechanisms are explicitly
designed to take these dynamics into account, gender norms
will not shift on their own, and in the post-conflict era, they
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113. Theidon, supra note 8, at 76. See also Coulter, supra note 22, at 14
(arguing, based on anthropological research in Sierra Leone, that a militarized masculinity has consequences for how female combatants are interpreted within a society, since “women who oppose female stereotypes in war
will often be regarded as deviant or unnatural”).
114. Theidon, supra note 8, at 76.
115. Amnesty Int’l, supra note 87, at 20 (“[W]omen and girls are also
killed because they are related to or have emotional ties with people who are
considered by the armed groups to be military targets.”).
116. INTER-AM. COMM’N ON H.R., supra note 106, at 18.
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may remain unchanged from the gender norms that
predominated in a society during the pre-conflict era.
In order to elucidate the manner in which gender affects
violence both during and after conflict, it is helpful to consider the role that gender may play before conflict arises, and
may play in fomenting or, at a minimum, perpetuating conflict. Colombian society reveals a phenomenon explained by
Kimberly Theidon as “militarized masculinity,”113 in which a
masculine identity is intrinsically connected to and dependent
on involvement in armed conflict. Theidon’s work describes
Colombian women who explained that in choosing romantic
partners, they seek out “gran hombres” (big men) who have
proven themselves desirable because they are successful combatants and leaders of the guerilla. Yet it is both men and women who are responsible for prioritizing these values within an
economy of war: militarized masculinity is valued not only by
the men whose guns are measures of power and prestige, but
also by women who view relationships with these men as valuable commodities. Violence and the gender constructs that accompany it are reinforced and idealized in a country that is all
too accustomed to war.114
In Colombia, women are targeted during conflict in horrific ways, and are victims of physical, psychological, and sexual
aggression. Sexual violence in particular is utilized with the
intention of undermining the strength of the enemy.115 Women are sometimes targeted for their behavior, including romantic relationships with a man of a particular faction, or for
refusal to obey proscribed social norms imposed by the group
controlling the region where they live.116 Women’s bodies are
also targeted in order to attack men who are considered the
enemy, as local custom charges men with the responsibility of
protecting the sexuality of their wives, sisters, or daughters.
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117. U.N. Econ. and Soc. Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence
Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Comm’n on Human Rights, ¶ 12,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/54 (Jan. 26, 1998) (by Radhika Coomaraswamy).
118. See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 87, at 3 (noting that women are targeted
“to sow terror within communities making it easier for military control to be
imposed, to force people to flee their homes, [and] to assist acquisition of
territory”).
119. INTER-AM. COMM’N ON H.R., supra note 106, at 37.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See id. (“[B]eing a prostitute . . . can drive the armed groups to persecute women and inflict on them the most appalling punishment.”); see also
Natalia Herrera & Douglas Porch, ‘Like Going to a Fiesta’ — the Role of Female
Fighters in Colombia’s FARC-EP, 19 SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 609, 624
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Sexual exploitation of a woman, therefore, targets not only a
woman but also the capacity of men to exert control and
power within their community. This phenomena is described
in a report by the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
Women after a visit to Colombia:
Perhaps more than the honor of the victim, it is the
perceived honor of the enemy that is targeted in the
perpetration of sexual violence against women; it is
seen and often experienced as a means of humiliating the opposition. Sexual violence against women is
meant to demonstrate victory over the men of the
other group who have failed to protect their women.
It is a message of castration and emasculation of the
enemy group. It is a battle among men fought over
the bodies of women.117
The behavior of guerillas as they exert their influence
over new regions of the country also demonstrates that relevance of sex and gender is not limited to acute physical sexual
violence against women. Territorial conquest of an area by
guerillas is generally accompanied by the exertion of strict social control over the local population.118 Guerillas often place
particular emphasis on adherence to antiquated, and/or formal gender roles.119 Men are prohibited from wearing long
hair or earrings.120 Women are required to dress modestly,
are forbidden from baring their legs or stomachs, and are
banned from sexual relationships outside of marriage.121 Homosexuality and prostitution are deemed irreconcilable with
traditional social structure and are banned.122 These rigid social controls reflect gender roles as they “should” be, and are
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in accordance with an idealized vision of “la patria” (the fatherland) as promulgated by the guerillas. They do not view
their policy of recruiting women combatants as being internally inconsistent with these national ideals, although these social norms are in direct opposition to the sexual and social
values lived out by the combatants in their daily lives.123
Gendered social controls allow the guerillas (men or women)
to demonstrate that it is they, and not the men of a community, who exert control over the population of a newly conquered area.
Oftentimes an end to conflict does not bring an end to
violence against women. In Colombia, one study revealed that
domestic violence was endemic in seven out of ten households
headed by a reintegrated combatant.124 Indeed, research
across the globe appears to suggest a “post-conflict” increase in
domestic violence, as was reported in a 2002 UNIFEM study on
the relationship between women and conflict.125 For example,
in Cambodia, one woman stated, “Men who have witnessed
and perpetrated violence during war seem to continually act
violently to their families. My husband was a Khmer Rouge
soldier. I think this has made him broken in some important
human way.”126 Research reflects that individuals who are
trained as soldiers to use violence as their primary means of
interacting with the world often have difficulty interacting with
their families in ways that do not involve violence;127 some
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(2008) (observing that homosexuality is considered a threat to discipline
and reporting on the execution of two men for homosexuality).
123. See Jordan, supra note 104 (noting the strict discipline enforced in
the FARC camps).
124. En 7 de Cada 10 Hogares de Reinsertados Hay Violencia, EL TIEMPO, (Mar.
31, 2008), http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-2880037.
125. ELISABETH REHN & ELLEN JOHNSON SIRLEAF, WOMEN, WAR AND PEACE:
THE INDEPENDENT EXPERTS’ ASSESSMENT ON THE IMPACT OF ARMED CONFLICT
ON WOMEN AND WOMEN’S ROLES IN PEACE-BUILDING 16 (2002) (citing Int’l
Comm. of the Red Cross, Women Facing War: ICRC Study on the Impact of Armed
Conflict on Women, 44-45, No. 844 (2001) (by Charlotte Lindsey)). While
research suggests an increase in post-conflict domestic violence, it should be
noted that the research is inconclusive, as it is difficult to determine whether
reports necessarily represent an increase in actual domestic violence, or an
increase in reporting of domestic violence.
126. Id. at 14 (citing CATHY ZIMMERMAN, PLATES IN A BASKET WILL RATTLE:
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CAMBODIA (1995)).
127. Id. at 15 (citing David Meddings & Stephanie M. Connor, Circumstances Around Weapon Injury in Cambodia After Departure of a Peacekeeping Force:
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commentators believe it is not the experience of conflict but
the culture of violence and masculinity that permeates military
forces that causes soldiers to be violent in civilian life.128 Without concrete efforts to modify the ways in which ex-combatants
conceptualize sexuality and violence, the training and ideology about gender roles that men and women receive during
wartime will endure in the post-conflict era. Instead of violence ending during the post-conflict era, violence occupies its
“normal” position in society, as intra-familial and intra-communal violence.
2. Female Combatants: Transitioning Between the Public and the
Private
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Prospective Cohort Study, 319 BRITISH MED. J. 412 (1999); Michael Markus et
al., Incidence of Weapon Injuries Not Related to Interfactional Combat in Afghanistan in 1996: Prospective Cohort Study, 319 BRITISH MED. J. 415 (1999); David
Meddings, Weapons Injuries During and After Periods of Conflict: Retrospective
Analysis, 315 BRITISH MED. J. 1417 (1997)).
128. Catherine Lutz & Jon Elliston, Domestic Terror, THE NATION, Oct. 14,
2002, at 18.
129. KAREN KAMPWIRTH, WOMEN AND GUERILLA MOVEMENTS: NICARAGUA,
EL SALVADOR, CHIAPAS, CUBA 4–6 (2002). There are some notable exceptions to this trend, and in recent years more scholars have turned their attention to this topic. For example, see CHRISTIANE LELIÈVRE AUSSEL ET AL.,
HACIENDO MEMORIA Y DEJANDO RASTROS: ENCUENTROS CON MUJERES EXCOMBATIENTES EN EL NOROIENTE DE COLOMBIA (2004) for an examination of the
role and sentiments of women combatants and contributors in the war in the
northeast of Colombia. See also Dietrich Ortega, supra note 20, for a global
perspective on female combatants and transitional justice.
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Woefully little research has been published on why women join armed combat groups.129 The choice to willingly
leave the “private” sphere of one’s hometown and family, and
to enter into the “public” sphere of the guerilla not only requires that women adopt a lifestyle that may be physically demanding and isolated, but one which also requires them to
adopt a role in society that is atypical from what may be expected of them as women. All combatants in the guerilla may
suffer the societal stigma of having transgressed a societal
norm by having joined an armed group, but these women may
suffer an additional stigma of having transgressed the
gendered expectation that a woman’s place is in the private
sphere. Sandra McEvoy offers the example of women combatants in Northern Ireland who manufactured petrol bombs in
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130. Sandra McEvoy, Loyalist Women Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland: Beginning a Feminist Conversation About Conflict Resolution, in GENDER AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 129, 130 (Laura Sjoberg ed., 2010).
131. For an excellent compilation of anthropological interviews with female combatants and their reflections on their service in the FARC, see Herrera & Porch, supra note 122, at 609.
132. Gunhild Schwitalla & Luisa Maria Dietrich, Demobilization of Female ExCombatants in Colombia, 27 FORCED MIGRATION R. 58, 58 (2007); Caterina
Chantal Arena, Development of Women Combatant Roles in Contemporary Armed
Conflict: The Case of Colombia, 11 MEDITERRANEAN J. HUM. RTS 65, 65 (2007).
133. Int’l Labor Org., Girl Combatants: Women Warriors Fight Their Way Back
into Liberian Society, WORLD OF WORK, Aug. 2005, at 8, 9–11, available at http:/
/www.ilo.org/wow/Articles/lang—en/WCMS_081362/index.htm.
134. Keith Stanski, supra note 90, at 141.
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their homes, an example which smashes open the public/private dichotomy with regard to women’s roles in conflict and
demands a nuanced “understanding of power relationships
previously considered straightforward, especially the relationship between the private and public sphere.”130
The research that is available offers a variety of motivations for women enlisting in combat.131 Feminism is definitely
an influence in many cases, primarily because it causes some
disintegration of gendered societal barriers and lessened male
opposition to females in combat. Additional explanations for
why Colombian women join combat include the desire to join
a partner, to avenge past crimes, or to escape from domestic
violence.132 Membership is sometimes also due to fear of
guerillas or to a scarcity of better options for survival. Some
women indicate that joining the guerilla can be empowering,
as it offers the promise of meaningful work and an adventurous lifestyle that is not available in traditional civilian life. According to the International Labor Organization, women in
Liberia joined combat to protect themselves from murder or
rape, or to prove their equality with males. All the research
reiterates limited options: “for many . . . females, becoming a
soldier was a matter of kill or be killed.”133 In Colombia, a
former girl combatant recalled being recruited by the FARC:
“Well, then every time he came to our house he asked us
whether we would go [to join the movement]. We decided to
go because he said it would give us an education that staying at
home wouldn’t. So we left.”134
Ironically, women who leave behind the private sphere
with the aspiration of attaining gender equality in the public
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135. Amnesty Int’l, supra note 87, at 27. But cf. LELIÈVRE AUSSEL ET AL.,
supra note 129, at 160–62, 172–78 (relaying a somewhat different picture of
the male-female relations among combatants based on interviews with former female combatants and describing relations as characterized by great
friendship and solidarity despite some difficulties women face if they become pregnant). It should be noted, however, that these interviews were
with members of other armed groups that had previously demobilized in the
1990s and did not include FARC members. Id. at 54.
136. Stanski, supra note 90, at 148 (quoting an anonymous Colombian woman who told him, “Two years ago, in 2000, I got pregnant. They gave me
an abortion but they didn’t tell me in advance that they were going to do it.
They told me they were checking on it. I wanted to have the baby.“).
137. Herrera & Porch, supra note 122, at 612. See also id. at 625 (citing
FARC policy that female combatants are required to abort in the first four
months of pregnancy and that revelation of a late-term pregnancy is interpreted as a desertion plan and punished with abortion).
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sphere of the world of combatants do not necessarily achieve
this goal, revealing that it is unhelpful to assume that once
women occupy public roles they are fully equal. Whether women remain at home with their families or join the combatants, their sexual lives are often dictated by the constraints of a
militarized, patriarchal society. As a civilian, a woman is subject to the threat of rape and social sexual controls if guerillas
occupy her home. Women who become combatants in Colombia are subject to a similarly rigid control over their sexual
activity, yet this type of control contrasts sharply with that exerted over civilians. Sexual activity with other soldiers is encouraged, yet regulated by top guerrilla commanders who
must grant permission for overnight visits between partners.
Protocol demands adherence to birth control methods; some
women report that a female’s orientation into a combat unit
includes mandatory insertion of Norplant or IUDs, and women who become pregnant are often forced to abort.135 One
woman reported that she visited a FARC nurse to monitor her
pregnancy and learned later that her fetus had been
aborted.136 The refusal to abort a pregnancy is one of the
most common explanations that demobilized women offer for
their decision to abandon the guerillas.137
The gap between an idealized notion of women’s capacity
to succeed outside the private sphere, and the reality of female
existence in the public sphere may leave women disenchanted
with their new “public” role as a combatants. Interviews with
demobilized women, whose ideology led them to join the revo-
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lutionary movement, indicated that they often left disillusioned.138 If women already have children prior to joining the
guerilla, they are generally prohibited from maintaining contact with them, and essentially must decide between having a
family and fighting.139 The experiences of women in combat
units tend to indicate that although it may appear that they
have crossed a barrier between the realm of the public and of
the private, that barrier may only have been temporarily or superficially transgressed.
3. Victims and Perpetrators: Why Colombians Become Combatants
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138. LELIÈVRE AUSSEL ET AL., supra note 129, at 215.
139. Chantal Arena, supra note 132.
140. See Enloe, supra note 77, at 53, for a discussion of the role of men
within the conflict in Bosnia, arguing, “[A]s soon as we start making the
experience of Bosnians problematically gendered, we no longer can subsume all women under the sprawling canopy of ‘victims’ nor all men under
the category of ‘militia fighters.’ ” In addition, there is a rich and evolving
body of literature that addresses masculinities and conflict. E.g., THE POSTWAR MOMENT: MILITARIES, MASCULINITIES AND INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING,
BOSNIA AND THE NETHERLANDS (Cynthia Cockburn & Dubravka Zarkov eds.,
2002); JOSHUA S. GOLDSTEIN, WAR AND GENDER (2001).
141. Stanski supra note 90, at 140–43; see also Herrera & Porch, supra note
122, at 614 (indicating FARC’s soldiers are “overwhelmingly rural, frequently
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The existence of female combatants undermines the stereotype that women within conflict are always and exclusively
victims. Their presence, however, also calls into question the
meaning of victimhood. If a person joins an armed fighting
group, but is coerced into joining, is she a victim or a perpetrator? What of an individual who willingly joins an armed
group, but does so because she knows that she has no other
opportunities to support herself at home? These queries apply
equally to men and to women. Just as the experience of female combatants in Colombia reveals the failings of classifying
women unilaterally as victims, so too does it demand greater
interrogation of men’s roles within conflict.140
Colombia’s military conflict has forced young girls and
young men into difficult situations with limited options. Both
men and women cite similar reasons for voluntarily joining
armed groups: lack of education, lack of opportunity, dedication to political cause, interest in the mystique and intrigue of
a life dedicated to revolutionary struggle.141 Human Rights
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Watch indicates that the choice to join the irregular military
forces is more an indication of dismal life choices for young
Colombians than a reflection of dedication to revolutionary
ideals.142 In addition to these considerations, it is notable that
sixty-five percent of those who enter are minors at the time
that they join.143 Former soldiers reflect that they were highly
impressionable when they joined and did not fully understand
the choices that they made. Upon demobilizing, many indicate that they deserted because they were tired of fighting and
tired of the lifestyle. Some expressed bitterness and a sense of
“engaño,” a Spanish term indicating that one feels he has been
duped and, consequently, taken advantage of. Foot soldiers
complain that commanders only care about the personal financial gain associated with the struggle, and that the young
recruits are exploited to do the dirty work.
In addition to being victims of economic and political circumstances that may push them to join armed groups, both
young men and women are subjected to the dominant gender
constructs of a militarized society in which expectations for
male and female behavior have developed.144 When they lack
traditional civilian symbols of success (such as education, housing, material goods, legal income), men may seek out other
ways to express and establish their masculinity through nontraditional means. Additionally, a young man without access
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illiterate or barely educated, heavily Indigenous or Afro-Colombian, and
young”).
142. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 36 (noting that “poverty, deprivation, underemployment, a truncated schooling, lack of affection and
family support, parental ill-treatment and insecurity” are push factors, while
“promises of money . . . thoughts of an easier life, a thirst for adventure, the
desire for a gun and a uniform, and simple curiosity” are pull factors).
143. Thiedon, supra note 8, at 75.
144. Id. at 81. See generally Nı́ Aoláin et al., supra note 71, at 17–18 (“[Boy
soldiers] are typically inculcated into cultures whose normative underlay is
based on the suppression of emotion. The perceived success of a boy’s development (for himself and his family) will be the expression of strength
both physical and emotional and the rejection of weakness . . . . The transmission of intergenerational expectations compounds the entrenchment of
stratified gender roles, and can nullify any attempts to advance gender
equality and the loosening of gendered expectations around caring and
parenting for women. The core point is that conflicted societies can mummify highly gendered role expectations for men and for women from early
childhood in ways that are quantifiably more intense than in societies not
experiencing communal violence.”).
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145. Kimberly Theidon, Reconstructing Masculinities: The Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Colombia, 31 HUM. RTS
Q. 1, 23 (2009).
146. Theidon, supra note 8, at 76.
147. See, e.g., Enloe, supra note 77 (focusing on one man to explain how
nationalism and the conflict in the Balkans became engendered).
148. Herrera & Porch, supra note 122, at 616.
149. Id. at n.15 (translating Estatuto de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia Ejercito Del Pueblo (FARC-EP), art. 8/G (undated)
(“The duties and rights in the FARC-EP are equal for all of its members
without petit bourgeois inequality”)).
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to traditional capital might use his physical body as the only
capital available to him, resulting in his joining the guerilla.145
For a young Colombian man with few other options, taking up
arms may be the only way of proving himself in a society in
which the economy is an economy of war.
Conversations with Colombia’s demilitarized combatants
reveal the highly gendered motivations behind the decision to
take up arms. Theidon interviewed young men who explained
that joining the paramilitaries “allowed them to ‘feel like a big
man in the streets of their barrios,’ to ‘go out with the prettiest
young women,’ and to ‘dress well,’ privileges they insist would
not have been possible if they weren’t carrying a gun.”146 Cultural ideas of masculinity and femininity in the context of war
mutually reinforce one another in Colombia, as they do in
other war zones.147 Women also experience a variety of gender-related rationales for joining. One young woman who
joined the FARC stated that she did so because she “saw these
women in uniform, with rifles looking very beautiful.”148
Others explicitly are attracted by the FARC’s claim to have created a gender-neutral organization.149 Whether the aspirations of men and women who become combatants are fulfilled
or not, it is clear that a multiplicity of factors propels them to
join the fighting, complicating our understanding of them as
either victims who have been forced to join, or perpetrators
who willingly do so out of cold-blooded desire to fight.
The highly gendered experiences of women and men undermine mainstream transitional justice’s inclination to identify individuals as either victims or as perpetrators. Recognizing the limitations of the victim/perpetrator model, one alternative framework that can be used to understand the various
roles at play in these conflicts is one that Peruvian peasants
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150. Lisa J. Laplante & Kimberly Theidon, Transitional Justice in Times of
Conflict: Colombia’s Ley de Justicia y Paz, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 49, 50 n.4
(2006).
151. Id.
152. See Nı́ Aoláin & Rooney, supra note 62, at 338–54 (describing a
“broader notion of redistributive justice in transition,” encompassing “recognition of structural inequalities and exclusions, and their intersectional impact on women’s potential to participate as equals in a transitional society”).
153. See Theidon, supra note 8, at 76 (noting that women “seek out these
‘gran hombres’ (big men) as desirable partners in an economy of war”).
154. Herrera & Porch, supra note 122, at 628.
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arrived at organically.150 In describing the ways in which their
lives had been forever changed by the guerilla warfare that
had ravaged the countryside, they referred to themselves as
“los aftectados,” or, “those who have been affected.”151 This
term encompassed the diversity of experiences within an entire rural community, and was more suitable than using the
descriptor “victim” for those who were killed, raped or displaced. Some people joined the guerilla, some were terrorized by the guerilla, some were related to victims or to combatants, but all members of the community were affected by the
political turmoil that dominated their lives.
The influence that gender has on men as well as on women should be an integral part of any transitional justice strategy in Colombia. Transitional justice does more than seek justice for human rights abuses of the past. It necessarily implicates the social elements, actors and norms that brought about
the violations in the first place. Therefore, transitional justice
has the potential to reconstruct a society, which has necessary
implications for gender roles.152 Social norms equating masculinity with military power need to be considered in a society
that attempts to review how it arrived at its current level of
abuse and violence. Women can also play a significant role in
societies that embrace hyper-masculinity; Theidon’s anthropological work documents this as women, ingrained in a society
that idealizes men who are militant, may seek the social capital
of dating men who are “macho” and who represent a masculine ideal.153 Additionally, in her complicated attempts to
overcome gender-based hierarchies in society, a female combatant may, as Herrera and Porch explain, be required by the
FARC to “become what she is not to succeed in the organization, to surrender her identity as a woman.”154 Transitional
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justice mechanisms must address this dynamic, since although
female combatants may have sought to break down gender
roles as fighters, when they no longer occupy this role, they
may have broken down gender roles to such an extent that
they are no longer able to be perceived, even by their compatriots in the struggle, as women. This situation thus denies
them the capacity to exist at the intersection of both their
identities as women and as soldiers.155 Normative gender constructs of a militarized society in conflict, like Colombia’s, may
position men and women uniquely depending on their gender, but both groups are victimized and left with few options as
a result of the limitations of these roles.
IV. EFFECTS
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155. Intersectionality refers to the feminist theory seeking to examine how
multiple intersecting categories of identity may interact on multiple and
often simultaneous levels. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 Stan. L. Rev.
1241 (1991) (applying “intersectionality as a way of framing the various interactions of race and gender in the context of violence against women of
color”). For a further discussion on the role of intersectionality within conflict, see Nı́ Aoláin & Rooney, supra note 62, 340–43.
156. Laplante & Theidon, supra note 150, at 51–52.
157. Marc Lifsher, Colombia’s New Leader Vows to Vanquish Guerrillas, WALL
ST. J., May 28, 2002, at A14.
158. Juan Forero, Colombian Rightists Declare Cease-Fire as Prelude to Talks,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2002, at A4.
159. L. 975, Julio 25, 2005, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.) [hereinafter
Justice and Peace Law].
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As early as 1953, Colombian administrations began to
make efforts to resolve conflict and to pursue peace with various armed groups, first with the left-wing guerillas and later
with the right-wing paramilitaries. All have grappled to find
the appropriate balance between achieving a peaceful resolution and a just one.156 After the multiple failures to secure
peace with the guerillas suffered by previous administrations,
President Uribe was elected on the promise of taking a hardline approach to the FARC.157 Beginning in 2002, Uribe’s government began negotiations with the paramilitaries.158 This
process led to the adoption of the Peace and Justice Law,
which was approved by the Colombian Congress in 2005 as
Law 975.159 The law represents an attempt to implement tran-
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160. Laplante & Theidon, supra note 150, at 51.
161. Justice and Peace Law, supra note 159.
162. CARAMES ET AL., supra note 5, at 20, 23.
163. Colombia’s Peace and Justice Law, CENTER FOR J. & ACCOUNTABILITYhttp://www.cja.org/article.php?id=863 (last visited Nov. 10, 2011).
164. Justice and Peace Law, supra note 159, art. 3, 29. According to the
International Federation for Human Rights, of the combatants who have demobilized under the Justice and Peace Law, eight percent are standing trial
and offering testimony for abuses committed, and ninety-two percent re-
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sitional justice mechanisms in a situation that, because the
fighting still continues, is actually a “pre-post conflict”160 context.
This section will describe some of the initial approaches
that the Colombian government has taken in its efforts to implement both transitional justice programs as well as DDR programs for combatants, and will then describe some of the ways
in which these efforts may fall short for female combatants. I
argue that these short-comings of transitional justice in Colombia can be understood as a result of an over-reliance on the
three false dichotomies of transitional justice laid out above.
Furthermore, as the example of female combatants demonstrates that these programs are not fully accomplishing their
goal of reordering society and paving the way for a more
peaceful future, it also demands consideration of the extent to
which transitional justice may simply reaffirm societal structures that pre-exist conflict.
The Peace and Justice Law lays out the parameters of Colombia’s Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
(DDR) program for paramilitaries.161 DDR has been attempted throughout the world in post-conflict settings and
aims to facilitate the decentralization and disbanding of members of armed groups and to enable ex-combatants to transition back into society through achieving economic and social
self-sufficiency.162 Under previous Colombian law, most rankand-file combatants are promised amnesty and a comprehensive reintegration package in return for laying down their
weapons.163 The Peace and Justice law applies to less than ten
percent of the more than 30,000 paramilitary leaders who have
demobilized since 2002, targeting those individuals who have
committed exceptional crimes, who are prosecuted at special
courts, and are promised drastically reduced sentences in exchange for full disclosure of crimes.164 This law has come
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under attack from human rights groups who argue that it
guarantees impunity for some of the worst human rights offenders because testimonies are not sufficiently transparent to
the public, too many criminals are offered amnesty, and because it undermines the victims’ rights to truth, justice, and
reparation.165 In the wake of this criticism, human rights
groups brought a challenge to the law at the Colombian Constitutional Court.166 The Court struck down parts of the law as
unconstitutional, resulting in stronger protection of victims’
rights, but upheld the law in general terms.167
It is beyond the scope of this article to present an exhaustive review of the Justice and Peace Law and its capacity for
transitional justice. Yet an examination of the ways in which
this law has failed to account for female combatants in Colombia reveals some of the deficiencies with regard to considering
gender in this strategy. Thus far, in Colombia no agreement
has been signed with the FARC, and therefore the lessons
learned in Colombia have only been applicable thus far to
small numbers of women from the paramilitaries. Some female combatants have abandoned the FARC, yet as of now,
there is no officially mandated program for them. Moving forward, an analysis of the successes and failures of DDR and transitional justice programs with regard to gender will be crucial
in light of the many ways that gender and conflict intersect in
Colombia. These considerations are ever more crucial taking
into consideration the high number of women in the FARC

R
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ceived automatic and complete amnesty. INT’L FED’N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
PARAMILITARY DEMOBILIZATION IN COLOMBIA: ON THE ROAD TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (2007), available at http://www.fidh.org/IMG/article_PDF/article_a4760.pdf. Laplante & Theidon supra note 150 at 79–80.
165. INT’L CRISIS GRP., LATIN AMERICA REPORT NO.16, COLOMBIA: TOWARDS
PEACE AND JUSTICE? 1 (2006), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/016-colombia-towardspeace-and-justice.aspx; Press Release, Int’l Ctr. for Transitional Justice, Brief
on Peace and Justice Law Presented to Constitutional Court (Jan 16, 2007)
(on file with author).
166. Criticism of the law culminated in 2006 when a consortium of 105
human rights groups and victims groups challenged the constitutionality of
Law 975 in Colombia’s Constitutional Court. See Corte Constitucional
[C.C.][Constitutional Court], Sala Plena mayo 18 2006, Sentencia C-370/06,
Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.), available at http://
www.fiscalia.gov.co/justiciapaz/Documentos/SentenciaC-370.pdf, (describing the original petition).
167. Id. at 374–78.
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168. Justice and Peace Law, supra note 159, art. 41. Article 41 law states,
“Attention to special needs: The judicial organs as well as the technical support agencies and the Procurator General’s Judicial Office for Justice and
Peace shall be mindful of the special needs of women, children, the elderly,
and the disabled to ensure their participation in the proceeding.” Id. (author’s translation).
169. Id. art. 50.
170. Charlesworth, supra note 21, at 13.
171. The relevant text of article 50 of the Justice and Peace Law reads,
“The President of the Republic shall designate as members of this commission five people, of which a minimum of two must be women.” Justice and
Peace Law, supra note 159, art. 50 (author’s translation).
172. The demobilization process is described in articles 10–31 of the Justice and Peace Law. Within these articles of the law, there is no gender
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guerilla forces who have yet to demobilize. A gender-oriented
strategy that anticipates the needs of both women and men
may indeed be persuasive in convincing combatants that they
have the support they need in order to demobilize.
The text of the Justice and Peace Law, for example, reflects a gender mainstreaming approach and attempts to bring
women from the private to the public sphere by incorporating
consideration of gender into the all human rights norms discussed, and all elements of transitional justice contemplated.
In particular, article 41 of the Peace and Justice Law provides
general guidance that “the special needs of women” should be
considered in implementation of the law.168 The law also
mandates creation of the Comisión Nacional de Reparacion y
Reconciliación (National Commission of Reparation and Reconciliation or NCRR), which is to consist of five individuals, of
whom at least two must be women.169 Both of these attempts
to integrate gender into elements of the law reflect consideration that women may be overlooked if not specifically addressed. Yet these articles provide perfect example of Hilary
Charlesworth’s critique that this approach is at once “too
broad and too narrow.”170 The law specifies that women
should be included on a national commission, yet offers no
indication of how exactly this should occur.171 It therefore
risks placing these two women in the position of being expected to speak on behalf of all women.
The Justice and Peace Law mandates a demobilization
process for paramilitary combatants, yet there are no specific
accommodations for female fighters.172 This failing of the
Peace and Justice Law is in direct contradiction of Security
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specific language regarding the potentially different needs of female and
male combatants. Id. art. 10–31.
173. See id. art. 10–31 (detailing demobilization without addressing needs
of male and female combatants); see also S.C. Res. 1325, supra note 57, ¶ 13
(“[The U.N. e]ncourages all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to consider the different needs of
female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their
dependants.”).
174. Schwitalla & Dietrich, supra note 132, at 58.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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Council Resolution 1325’s requirement that DDR programs
should strive to explicitly consider the needs of male and female combatants.173 The law allows combatants to demobilize
either as individuals or as a collective group of fighters. According to government statistics, 41,000 paramilitaries that
have demobilized thus far. Of these, 31,000 did so collectively
(through a group’s agreement with the government), and six
percent of the collective demobilizations were females. Ten
thousand paramilitaries demobilized individually, and fourteen percent of the individual demobilizations were female.174
These numbers reflect that thousands of paramilitary women
have demobilized with no gender-specific support.
The failure of Colombia’s DDR programs to consider the
specific needs of female combatants appears to reflect a reliance on the assumption that men occupy the position of combatants or perpetrators, leaving women to occupy the position
of victims. Yet, in DDR programs, gender-specific support is
crucial to the long-term success of programs for women because of the numerous problems women encounter that male
demobilized combatants do not typically encounter.175 For example, women who have left their homes to join combat often
originate from areas dominated by the FARC, making a return
to their home community after deserting impossible. Women
who demobilize come from thirty-one of Colombia’s thirty-two
departments, and generally come from small towns in rural
areas, yet eighty-five percent chose to resettle in the anonymity
of large urban areas.176 Although a return to their home regions and families might provide substantial economic and social support, many of these women resettle far from their families to avoid reprisals by former fellow combatants whom they
left behind in the ranks. Thus, women who may have little
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177. Dietrich Ortega, supra note 20, at 164.
178. Herrera & Porch, supra note 122, at 625 (citing one former female
combatant as saying, “A child undermines the morale of the guerrilla, who
abandons the love of the revolution for the love (of the child)”).
179. Id. at 626–27.
180. Press Release, U. N. Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children & Armed Conflict, Former Girl Soldiers Bring
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education or training other than that they received in combat
may be left with no prospects for survival. Furthermore, they
may require gender specific accommodations, such as protection from abusive partners, gynecological care, or skills and
training programs that are matched to the life experiences of
women, who may have had fewer educational or professional
opportunities than their male counterparts.177 Without special attention to considerations such as these, women may
enter shelters alongside the same men with whom they served,
or who may have sexually violated them. Demobilization programs with no special accommodation for women without support systems are destined to fail these women.
In addition to these challenges, parenthood, and in particular, motherhood, often complicates the DDR process. Although the attitude toward sexual activity between combatants
varies, some women invariably become pregnant while they
are enlisted. Interviews with female ex-combatants reflect a
widespread understanding of, and agreement with, the prohibition against pregnancy, which may undermine morale and
dedication to the guerilla.178 Despite support of these ideals,
women who desert their units are primarily driven by the desire to have a stable family life, and the desire to have children,
or by the reality that they have become pregnant.179 These
desires cause some Colombian women to demobilize individually, as they are not permitted to have children and would otherwise be forced to abort. Once they have demobilized and
are pregnant or accompanied by small children, they require
neo-natal or child-care. Complications due to motherhood demand that DDR programs are gender aware; in Uganda, for
example, some girls fought, became pregnant, and abandoned
their units all before reaching their twelfth birthdays. For
these adolescents, the requirement placed on ex-combatants
to attend school as a pre-condition for participation in a
Ugandan DDR program was unimaginable due to other demands on their time.180 Similar challenges face Colombian
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Hope to Their Peers (Nov. 9, 2007), http://www.un.org/children/conflict/
english/pr/2007-11-09171.html.
181. Dietrich Ortega, supra note 20, at 165 (noting that gender flexibility
during the conflict gains are rarely translated into post-conflict gains).
182. Herrera & Porch, supra note 122 at 612.
183. See Dietrich Ortega, supra note 20, at 162.
184. Herrera & Porch, supra note 122, at 626–27.
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women who have become mothers during their time in combat. DDR processes must provide tailored services for these
young, single, displaced mothers who lack other support networks.
Another difficulty facing female combatants during the
post-conflict reconstruction era is that in taking up arms in a
violent conflict, often they have broken cultural stereotypes regarding women’s behavior, which is certainly true in the context of Colombia. Once a woman departs from the private
sphere to the public one, it may be difficult for her to remain
there once the fighting is over.181 Despite the ideals that may
propel woman to join a fighting unit, these groups (and society at large) may still rely on a hyper-masculine vision of military power that does not allow for women to take on these
roles. Interviews with Colombian women reveal that, despite
having deserted, many women take pride in having made a
contribution to their country.182 Many also take pride in having asserted their agency to affect their life experience, and
are empowered by these events.183 Yet this perception and the
shift in mind-set that may accompany it are rarely accepted by
society at large. Women who fight as combatants have shattered their home communities’ perceptions of gender roles,
and are often likely to face discrimination and may not be accepted within traditional society.184
For these reasons, the experience for female combatants
during the “post-conflict” era and with accompanying transitional justice programs may be one of disempowerment, and
disillusion, hence complicating the notion that difficulties for
women end once the conflict itself ends. Although societal
constructs regarding gender vary greatly across the globe,
some level of resistance to shifting norms regarding women’s
roles in society is a theme that arises in nearly every context in
which women have fought. Despite the instrumental contribution of women as fighters, many liberation movements expect
women to maintain the cultural and familial elements of soci-
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185. Sondra Hale, Liberated but Not Free: Women in Post-War Eritrea, in THE
AFTERMATH: WOMEN IN POST-CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION, 122, 125 (Sheila
Meintjes, Anu Pillay, & Meredeth Turshen eds., 2001).
186. Harry G. West, Girls with Guns: Narrating the Experience of War of FRELIMO’s “Female Detachment”, 27 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q., 180, 180 (2004).
187. Id. at 183 (citing BARRY MUNSLOW, MOZAMBIQUE: THE REVOLUTION
AND ITS ORIGINS (1983)).
188. Id. at 189–90.
189. Id. at 190.
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ety. Their “natural” feminine roles are romanticized: as
mothers, supporters of their men, or “keepers of the
hearth.”185 If they transgress these ideals, they may be stigmatized in society. These gender-related stigmas can pose additional challenges for women as they attempt to reintegrate
into their communities, which are compounded by the stigma
that all combatants who have participated in violent acts already face through reintegration. For example, one anthropological study focused on the experience of female fighters
from Mozambique who participated in the FRELIMO independence movement, interviewing these women two decades
after they put down their arms.186 There, demobilization
processes occurred, yet took no special consideration of female combatants and the difficulties that faced them as they
reintegrated into a patriarchal society after assuming traditionally “male” roles. During combat, when women began to frequently appear with guns slung over their shoulders, the elders
of villages complained to guerilla leaders that this presented
“an unacceptable challenge to ‘traditional’ societal relationships.”187 Women explained that, after the war ended, they
felt abandoned by the movement. Any pretense of gender
equality was apparently only due to the exigencies of wartime,
and these women were ultimately socially ostracized.188 Even
the guerilla men with whom they had fought refused to view
them as equals; one ex-combatant was told by a former lover
that she was too “feisty and independent”189 to continue a relationship, reflecting that patriarchy and sexism remained endemic to the private sphere, even if their temporary upheaval
in the public sphere led to the country’s liberation. Although
the DDR process in Colombia is relatively new, and empirical
research is lacking on the subjective experiences of women
who have attempted to reintegrate, the Mozambique experience serves as a cautionary tale for Colombia, should Colom-
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190. CARLA KOPPELL & JONATHAN TALBOT, STRENGTHENING COLOMBIA’S
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE PROCESS BY ENGAGING WOMEN 1, 3 (2011).
191. Dietrich Ortega, supra note 20, at 168.
192. Id. at 171.
193. Id. at 161.
194. Id. at 170.
195. Id. For a discussion of the ways in which institutions may implicitly
funnel women into the “victim” category, see Fiona C. Ross, Women and the
Politics of Identity: Voices in the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
in VIOLENCE AND BELONGING: THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY IN POST-COLONIAL AFRICA 195 (Vigdis Broch-Due ed., 2005).
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bia neglect to consider the additional challenges of women in
DDR.
The role that truth and reconciliation commissions may
play in Colombia is also relevant, considering the existence of
the National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation
(CNRR). Part of this group’s mandate includes the creation of
a Historical Memory Commission, which is meant to incorporate women’s stories into the history of the conflict, as well as a
Transversal Unit for Gender and Specific Populations, intended to mainstream gender into all CNRR activities.190
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions may be problematic
for women who have served as combatants, as they “have
tended to operate on narrowly defined and mutually exclusive
categories of victims and perpetrators.”191 There may also
tend to be a focus on women as victims. This may have
broader implications for a post-conflict society, including that
it may promote stereotypical notions of women as peaceful,
and may obscure the roles that women have played in promoting violence.192 Dietrich Ortega, however, highlights the important ways in which truth and reconciliation commissions
may offer an important opportunity to recast the stories of individuals in a more complex and nuanced way than other transitional justice mechanisms may allow.193 Unfortunately, although cases such as Timor-Leste, Haiti, and Sierra Leone offered examples of commissions that took concrete efforts to
build capacity on gender issues,194 these efforts prioritized female victims over female combatants,195 thus reflecting their
incapacity to encompass the realities of individuals who may
exist within both categories of victim and perpetrator.
Liberia provides another cautionary tale of what may transpire in Colombia if no special consideration is provided to
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Id. at 10.
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S.C. Res. 1325, supra note 57, at ¶ 13.
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female ex-combatants, and if transitional justice and DDR programs simply reinforce these false assumptions about the role
of women in conflict. Liberian women who took up arms also
struggled with re-integration after abandoning traditional
roles as women.196 One ex-general, who fought as part of a
group of insurgents against Charles Taylor’s government, still
sees herself as responsible for her female soldiers.197 Amidst
uncertainty about what DDR programs entailed, these women
expressed hesitance to enroll.198 They also expressed great
frustration with their society.199 Many had joined combat because it appeared to be a means to counter oppression of women and to flaunt gender roles.200 To their disappointment,
they discovered that sexism in their society was more firmly
entrenched than they had realized. In that case, transitional
justice mechanisms served only to reinforce the sexism and
gendered norms about women in society, rather than to challenge them and pave the way for a broader and more complex
understanding of women’s identities. One woman who led a
forty-woman unit explained, “We first were fighting men with
our guns, now we have given up our guns, but we still have to
fight men, this time with our pens. That’s what I try to tell my
girls now.”201
The United Nations has made a concerted effort to address challenges facing demobilized female fighters. Security
Council Resolution 1325 addresses the unique needs of female
and male ex-combatants and their dependents.202 The UN
has also released briefing papers on potential solutions to
some of these challenges. These solutions may include very
simplistic yet non-obvious and non-trivial proposals, such as
ensuring that both women’s and men’s clothing is offered in a
benefits package. They may require more complex ones as
well, such as addressing varying types of psychological and
post-traumatic syndromes that may manifest differently for
men and women, incorporating the involvement of women’s
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community groups, or providing support for various conflict
related disabilities or substance abuse problems that may affect
men and women in distinct manners.203 Despite these UN efforts to raise awareness on the role that gender plays in DDR,
Colombia has not yet made any specific effort to accommodate
women soldiers.204
In addition to mandating the demobilization of combatants, the Justice and Peace Law also addresses compensation
for victims of human rights abuses. Broader concerns regarding the insufficiency of these means have already been elaborately reported on elsewhere.205 The law provides reparations
for victims and DDR for perpetrators. But if a woman, for example, was raped by a member of the paramilitaries, and then
joined the guerrilla in order to seek revenge against her rapist,
the law is not able to accommodate her experience. One female combatant was interviewed as explaining that, three years
after deserting the guerrilla, she is still trying to reconcile her
role there: “they did me harm, but I also did harm . . . So you
become a victim and a victimizer.”206 The law in Colombia
must seek to encompass the realities of women such as this
combatant, who simultaneously identify as both a victim and a
perpetrator.
V. CONCLUSION: CONCEPTUALIZING A VISION
INCLUSIVE TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
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203. See U.N. Dep’t for Disarmament Affairs, Gender Perspectives on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, (March 2001) (discussing
gendered approaches to disarmament).
204. JARAMILLO ET AL., supra note 8, at 16.
205. E.g., INT’L CRISIS GRP. supra note 165, at 11–14.
206. Nadja Drost, To Win the War, Colombia Needs Female Fighters to Lay Down
Their Arms, GLOBAL POST (June 1, 2011), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/colombia/110525/farc-female-guerrillas.
207. Teitel, supra note 9, at 76.
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A gender-oriented analysis of transitional justice recognizes the inherent shortcomings with implementing any postconflict measures. Any measure to rebuild a society after conflict is necessarily an imperfect, incomplete task.207 Theoretical critiques reveal inherent flaws and inadequacies of the process as it is implemented in various societies. On-the-ground
practitioners, often distanced from theory, are faced with an
imperative to act and may not have the time or institutional
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208. Nesiah, supra note 11, at 801.
209. Pablo de Greiff, Establishing Links Between DDR and Reparations, in DISARMING THE PAST, supra note 6, at 146.
210. See Theidon, supra note 8 (discussing DDR within a local-level transitional justice framework).
211. It is important to recognize, however, the concern that feminists articulate regarding utilizing the community as the primary source of reordering a society, in that communities may potentially represent patriarchal or
traditional voice in defining the membership and values of the “commu-
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space to engage with complications in distinguishing who are
the victims and who are perpetrators.208 This gap between
theory and practice is evident, as many of the scholars who
write about gender and transitional justice fail to answer the
most difficult question: What might a genuinely feminist version of transitional justice look like? I suggest that incorporation of a gender-critique of transitional justice hinges on sacrificing some of the idealism endemic to this field.
If a primary aim of transitional justice is to truly re-legitimize the state and prevent the re-occurrence of violence, it is
crucial, argues Pablo DeGreiff, to implement transitional justice measures in a way that reinforces their relationships with
other initiatives that seek to provide recognition and build
civic trust.209 Therefore, an inter-related, holistic approach to
transitional justice is important, but it must also actively resist
simply re-cementing societal relationships that laid the
groundwork for conflict in the first place. Although they are
not the only elements of society relevant to conflict, normative
conceptions of gender, as well as hyper-masculinity and
hetero-normativity, have been demonstrated to play a role in
fomenting conflict, as discussed throughout this article. If
these gender norms and hierarchies are part of what leads to
conflict, it is crucial that transitional justice challenge them.
This article highlights three false dichotomies with regard to
the role that gender plays in conflict, and argues that in order
for transitional justice mechanisms to truly succeed, scholars
and practitioners must develop creative, gender-aware strategies to overcome these dichotomies.
The incorporation of transitional justice from below may
offer one important method for addressing gender within conflict.210 This might mean that mechanisms are implemented
not only on an international and domestic level, but that they
are also community based.211 Organizing on a community
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nity.” For a broader discussion of these concerns regarding “bottom-up”
transitional justice, see Catherine O’Rourke, The Shifting Signifier of “Community” in Transitional Justice: A Feminist Analysis, 23 WIS. J.L. GEND. & SOC’Y 269
(2008).
212. Julie Mertus, supra note 21, at 550–54.
213. Nı́ Aoláin & Turner, supra note 17, at 243 (stating that women’s diverse roles during conflict could allow them to make significant contributions to peace processes).
214. Thanks to Naomi Cahn for alerting me to the terminology of “social
services justice,” which focuses on the social, economic, medical, and psychological components of providing justice to victims. See Naomi Cahn, Beyond
Retribution and Impunity: Responding to War Crimes of Sexual Violence, 1 STAN. J.
C.R. & C.L. 217, 247–49 (2005) (describing “social services justice” as a more
holistic, gender-sensitive form of transitional justice).
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level can promote awareness of issues that face former
soldiers, can spark public examination of male and female
gender roles, or can inspire consideration of why families reject rather than support their daughters who have been
raped.212 In Colombia, this might occur through supporting
the numerous grassroots women’s organizations that already
advocate for peace, and by bringing them into policy decisions
at a the state and international levels. Turner and Nı́ Aoláin’s
claim that any truth commission should include women of diverse experiences and background is a useful strategy for any
transitional justice mechanism,213 in that inclusion of diversity
of experience is essential.
Another lesson learned regarding inclusion of gender
considerations, if the dichotomy between conflict and postconflict is a false one, is that the scope of transitional justice
programs may need to encompass more activity than previously thought. This calls for a more broad-based, holistic approach to transitional justice that is capable of recognizing the
diversity and complexity of experiences that women and men
experience before, during and after conflict. One way in
which this might be approached is to pursue means of other
forms of justice, such as “social services justice” that may not
involve legal mechanisms, but may address some of the social
and economic harms that women and men may experience as
more serious than other forms of violations.214
Specific modifications should also be made with regard to
the DDR process in order to accommodate female combatants’ unique needs. The DDR program in Sierra Leone, for
example, suffered from low participation of female combat-
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217. See, e.g., Waldorf, supra note 6 (arguing that both transitional justice
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218. Id. at 17; Theidon, supra note 8, at 67.
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ants. Of the 72,500 combatants that demobilized, only 4,751
(6.5%) were women.215 It is unknown exactly how many women were fighters, yet it is widely accepted that only a small
percentage of female fighters were demobilized.216 Although
this DDR process was widely regarded as a success by the UN
and as a model for future DDR programs, the low numbers of
female participation indicates that the program may have
failed many of its intended beneficiaries. Improvements for
other future programs might include: specific programs aimed
at supporting women in the long term, programming that recognizes that demobilized women may mother children toward
whom they have ambivalent feelings because of the identity of
father; elimination of gender stereotyping in skill and job
training in DDR programs; or insurance of women’s health
and childcare facilities. If money is distributed in a DDR process, it is crucial to recognize that women and men may not
have identical access to financial institutions, requiring increased protection and security for women’s new economic
opportunities that may arise in a post-conflict era. In Colombia, especially considering the high number of women who
have yet to demobilize from the FARC, changes such as these
could radically improve women’s chances for self-sufficiency
after disarming, and could incentivize demobilization among
women.
Not only must DDR programs consider such specific considerations for women, but other transitional justice mechanisms are intimately connected to these concepts of ensuring
that both men’s and women’s needs are met. Scholars and
practitioners are increasingly aware of the important overlap
between DDR and transitional justice.217 This potential for
cross-pollination offers benefits both for men and for women,
and in particular, the reintegration phase of DDR may be a
particularly good time to coordinate with transitional justice,
since transitional justice mechanisms may significantly assist
with reintegration into communities.218 For example, as indicated above, DDR may make accommodations to make sure
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219. Mackenzie, supra note 22, at 252, 257 (describing the failure of DDR
programs to recognize women as combatants and communities’ stigmatization of women combatants).
220. de Greiff, supra note 209, at 139.
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that women receive financial benefits of a demobilization program, but then as a government implements a broader transitional justice schema, true access to these financial benefits
may require evaluation of laws to ensure that women have the
legal structures that allow them to exert control over their financial resources.
Transitional justice in Colombia must also take caution in
considering how programs employ definitions of actors in conflict. As discussed above, the distinction commonly employed
by transitional justice mechanisms between victims and perpetrators may not always benefit individuals who do not clearly
identify as one or the other, which may represent a majority of
a conflict-ridden society. Megan MacKenzie highlights that by
sidelining women and girl soldiers as “sex-slaves” or “porters”
rather than as “combatants,” the Sierra Leone DDR program
did a disservice to these women who, regardless of whether
they physically fought in combat, were marginalized by their
communities who primarily identified them as combatants.219
Thus, by ignoring the role that these women played and by
encouraging them simply to return to their “normal places” in
the community, DDR programs failed to offer them the support needed and stripped them of any new roles or positions
of authority they may have held during the conflict. These
failings meant that a valuable opportunity to rethink or
reshape gender stereotypes and hierarchies was missed. The
definition of the term “combatants” is also relevant if gender is
ignored—even in the case of conventional conflicts with wellorganized armies, the boundary between combatants and noncombatants is often porous.220
As argued throughout this article, it is imperative that the
scope of inquiry into gender roles be broadened as transitional justice is implemented. An examination of the role of
women in conflict offers insights into ways that transitional justice could be improved for women, but in order to create effective policy interventions for women, strategies that reflect
the complicated and shifting realities on the ground for both
women and men are required. The various roles that men ex-

31113-nyi_44-1 Sheet No. 83 Side A

12/07/2011 07:07:40

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYI\44-1\NYI102.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 59

FALSE DICHOTOMIES OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

6-DEC-11

14:46

161

R

12/07/2011 07:07:40

221. See Nı́ Aoláin et al., supra note 71, for an extensive discussion of this
question.
222. José E. Arvelo, International Law and Conflict Resolution in Colombia:
Balancing Peace and Justice in the Paramilitary Demobilization Process, 37 GEO. J.
INT’L L. 411, 413–14, 428 (2006).
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perience during conflict demand that transitional justice programs aimed at men are called into question as well. Although
programming that takes into account women’s diverse experiences is a major emphasis of this article, perhaps the true test
of whether transitional justice incorporates gender is the degree to which it can take into account the diversity of men’s
experiences during conflict. The social, economic and political problem solving that inherently occurs during an era of
transitional justice must seek to understand and potentially
dismantle the ways in which men may inherit notions of the
role of violence in society, what is “masculine,” and how they
as individuals seek to identify themselves in this context.
Some examples of initiatives aimed at altering the perception of men’s role with conflict might include those that acknowledge the difficulty that a society, and men themselves,
may have in recognizing the victimization of men and boys as
combatants.221 Support is needed for men who, in leaving
their position as combatants, have lost their primary group
identity as men, and coming from backgrounds with little educational or professional opportunity, may be left without a
sense of their role within or contribution to society. Community organizations and non-profits with expertise in this area
may be beneficial in offering support and role models in this
arena. Male-specific support may also be useful for men who
have witnessed sexual violence, who have suffered sexual
abuse themselves, or who may reject a hetero-normative concept of sexuality.
It is crucial that domestic and international actors acknowledge the specificity of each post-conflict context, and
that domestic political challenges unique to each context can
complicate transitional justice measures. For example, the Colombian Congress debated numerous approaches to transitional justice, each of which was located in a different spot
along the spectrum of the “peace versus justice” debate.222
One means to address competing needs of different sectors
might include parallel structures of transitional justice mecha-
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nisms. For example, truth commissions can be implemented
side-by-side with criminal hearings, and need not be mutually
exclusive.
Finally, although this article is limited to a discussion of
transitional justice mechanisms such as trials, truth commissions and DDR programs, it is also important to consider a
variety of alternative mediums for post-conflict reconstruction
that typically fall outside the ambit of transitional justice. In
order to ensure that gender-related injustices and abuses
within society are not perpetuated as a society is rebuilt in a
post-conflict era, it is crucial that societies invest in long-term
development of rule of law and institution building from a
gender-aware perspective, as well as implementing short-term
transitional justice mechanisms with an eye toward the important role that gender inherently plays in conflict.
Had some of these mechanisms been in place, how might
Colombia’s justice system have approached Lorena, the
paramilitary assassin described at the beginning of this article?223 Had she not been murdered, how should the law have
accounted for her crimes? Difficult life circumstances drove
her to join combat, but it is difficult to argue that these circumstances constituted duress and should exonerate her from
the crime of having murdered dozens of people in cold blood.
Yet in Colombia, Lorena is not alone. Thousands of other women and men have participated in combat and committed
atrocious violations of human rights, and many have done so
due to a variety of complicated motives. Were Colombia to
implicate all who bore some degree of guilt, the country might
be faced with the imprisonment or condemnation of entire
communities of people.
Transitional justice mechanisms offer no ideal solution
for a combatant in Lorena’s position, both a perpetrator of
violence and also a victim of it. When abuse has occurred, a
country must draw the line between looking backward to seek
accountability for the past, while simultaneously looking forward. This demands a vision that smart, well-conceptualized
transitions from violence to peace will prevent such atrocities
from reoccurring. As the challenges raised by Colombian female combatants demonstrate, gender inclusiveness is a cru-
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cial element if transitional justice mechanisms hope to make
society more decent and just.
In post-conflict settings, accountability should be carried
out with an eye toward remedying basic injustices of society,
rather than perpetuating them. Practitioners and scholars
must be cognizant of the way in which gender is instrumental
to any transitional justice endeavor that seeks to fundamentally reshape a society where violent conflict has occurred.
Both domestic and international actors, therefore, working in
post-conflict contexts must strive to address gender dynamics
and consider the way in which men’s and women’s proscribed
roles may contribute to conflict. Failing this, the endeavor of
transitional justice risks reinforcing gendered norms that offer
men and women limited options in post-conflict societies. Despite the tragedies that have often occurred during conflict, an
era in which transitional justice is being implemented provides
an opportunity to transform the origins of conflict. To engage
in this process without considering the underlying gender dynamics that perpetuate conflict ignores crucial components of
these societies, and undermines any aspiration of achieving either transition or justice for women and for men.
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